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Public private partnership (PPP) projects involve a variety of project governance structures. 
Common among all these varied structures is the long-term contractual period between multiple 
public and private entities. These entities include government, concessionaire and financier. The 
increased uncertainty of a long-term contract duration coupled with the involvement of multiple 
actors proves to be a challenge to developing risk mitigation strategies in PPP. Therefore, it is 
necessary to systematically collect, assess and frame the risks associated with these projects and 
explore associated dynamics. There has been a recent shift towards focusing on interactions of 
parties due to shared risks. Exploring the interactions among the parties in risk and renegotiation 
scenarios can help in understanding and mapping out the potential outcomes and multiple 
strategies for each party. The main objectives of this dissertation are: 1) Establish risks affecting 
PPPs: Macro, Market and Project level; 2) Identify timeline for the identified risks where they 
occur in or affect a project phase; 3) Analyze three-party interactions in the context of identified 
risks as well as renegotiation scenarios; and 4) Develop a model to quantify the 
actions/interactions between parties and the resulting outcome. This is tackled through the use of 
techniques such as Systematic Literature Review (SLR) and Delphi Technique to create a 
framework/model to assess risks in PPP projects. Following that scenario analysis, three-party 
interactional analysis and simulation were conducted to model the risk and renegotiation 




This combined approach can help planners to prepare for a range of complex and uncertain 
scenarios. This dissertation extends the current literature by (i) integrating the framing of the risks 
with their modeling and simulation, and (ii) expanding the analysis of interactions to three parties 
in risk and renegotiation scenarios. Two case studies are conducted to showcase the proposed 
framework. This framework can be used by any party to a PPP project to assess risks and 
simulate risk scenarios to understand the outcome of the different strategies available. This can be 
used to propose mitigation strategies for each party. Interactional analysis, as proposed in this 
dissertation, has been introduced to simulate three-party interactions specifically in PPP risk 
scenarios. However, it can be further applied to other three-party situations in different project 





Public Private Partnerships added up to $450 billion dollars worth of projects worldwide from 
1985 to 2004 (Ho 2006). This form of project delivery involves many parties closely working 
together to address challenges related to infrastructure development. Konchar and Sanvido (1998) 
studied three forms of project delivery systems: construction management at risk, design build, 
and design bid build and reported that design build showed better results than others in terms of 
higher project delivery speed and improved cost by eliminating the separate bid process for each 
phase and combining them into one. PPP projects are in part design-build with the addition of the 
operation phase. Since the PPP organization consists of various parties, it faces risks associated 
with the interaction of the internal and external parties manifested in the project that could result 
in delays or cost overruns or both. The escalation of these problems causes project modifications, 
halting of work and sometimes even the cancellation of projects. These problems manifest 
themselves in one of the major risks that face PPP projects, renegotiation.  
 
1.1 Problem Statement  
PPP projects are necessary to address the increasing challenges associated with infrastructure 
development. The application of PPP has faced increasing challenges that require the study of 
risks in every stage of a PPP project with respect to the country-level, market-level and project-
level as well. Along with that, this unique project structure presents distinctive interactions 
between parties that dictate how projects progress. PPP projects face technical complexities as 




in their interactions together (Dehornoy 2012). One of the most common risks facing PPP 
projects is renegotiation of the contract as presented by previous studies (Guasch et al. 2007; 
Guasch and Straub 2008; Engel et al. 2009; Nikolaidis and Roumboutsous 2013; Guasch et al. 
2014; Cruz et al. 2014). These renegotiations are affected by the relationship and interactions of 
the parties involved, which affect the negotiation outcome. No previous work has been done to 
relate interactional effects of parties in PPP projects within situations of renegotiation. No work 
has also focused on the timeline of risk occurrence and how it might cascade into other phases of 
the project. Additionally, previous work has only focused on the public and private party in a 
negotiation scenario without taking into perspective the effect of outside parties such as the 
general public in instigating or altering renegotiations. 
 
1.2 Research Questions and Thesis  
Renegotiations are a common risk in PPP projects considering the complexity of the network of 
these projects including the actors and their interactions. Analysis of these interactions in the 
context of renegotiations may provide insights such as the patterns in the nature of dynamics 
between actors in common renegotiation scenarios. Analysis of interactions in terms of power 
relations can reduce the recurrence of renegotiations, increase the chances of settlement, and 
ultimately impact the project lifecycle.  
Thesis 
A PPP project involves multiple actors and their resulting interactions, which leads to a complex 
set of project lifecycle risks. Study of the interactions among multiple parties to a risk can assist 
in analyzing the outcome of the project lifecycle risk thereby increasing the chances of settlement 





1.3 Research Objective 
The objectives of this research can be divided into four parts: 
1 Create a risk registry for risks affecting PPP projects under: Macro, Market and Project 
level. 
2 Identify high risks and the timeline for the identified risks where they might occur or 
affect a project phase.  
3 Identify parties to various risk scenarios in PPP projects.  
4 Analyze three-party interactions in the context of identified risks, develop a model to 
quantify the actions/interactions between parties and the resulting outcome and propose 




Figure 1.1 Flowchart showing Research Objectives 
 
  
1. Create a risk registry for 
PPP projects and model to 
assess risks (ICRAM-PPP)
2. ID and map high risks 
according to project using the 
Delphi technique
4. Interactional analysis of 
risk/renegotiation scenarios
3. ID parties involved in 






1.4  Research Scope 
The scope of this research can be divided into two main areas: 
In terms of project type: the focus of this research is on public private partnership projects and 
complexity that ensues from the long engagement between the public and private entities as well 
as the effect of external entities on the project. 
In terms of analysis: the focus of this research is on three-party interactional analysis in the 
context of risk associated with the project that might lead to renegotiation of the contractual terms 
between the project stakeholders/parties to the contract. 
 
1.5  Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review for this dissertation. It starts by defining public-private-
partnership projects and moves along to discuss its types, advantages and the challenges faced by 
PPP projects. It then introduces risk analysis in PPP projects, the International Construction Risk 
Assessment Model (ICRAM), scenario planning, and interactional analysis. Chapter 3 lays out 
the framework for the methodology followed in this dissertation and briefly discusses the 
objectives. Chapter 4 presents the approach used to create the International Construction Risk 
Assessment Model for Public Private Partnership projects (ICRAM-PPP). Chapter 5 presents the 
Indiana Toll Road project and Tanzania Railway project case studies. It ties all the work 
performed in the dissertation through a case study approach. It starts with the application of 
ICRAM-PPP for the Indiana Toll Road in order to assess the high risks affecting the project and 
one of these high risks is then chosen to propose the interactional analysis framework for three-
party interactions in a risk scenario. This is also performed for the Tanzania Railway project in 
the context of renegotiation and shown in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Public-Private Partnership Projects 
2.1.1 Definition of Public Private Partnerships 
PPP is defined as a venture between public and private entities for the delivery of a service 
combining design, build, finance, operate, maintain and lease or transfer (Pallister and Law 
2006). It is a long-term contract where the government pays the private sector for the construction 
and/or delivery of a service (Chhun 2014). The period of contract can range from 10 to 30 years 
and sometimes can even reach 99 years.  
Some projects are successful in reaching the set goals while the majority of projects 
deviate and may even fail. Success of projects can be attributed to various factors, out of which 
reacting to conditions such as political and economic disruptions is vital (Ashley et al. 1998). Li 
et al. (2005) discuss the critical success factors in PPP projects in the UK, which include risk 
allocation and creation of a management framework as the top two factors. These two factors can 
be addressed through the study of the high risks facing PPP projects with a focus on the 
interaction between the parties. The success of PPP projects is also dependent on the 
compatibility and similarity between the public and private parties’ goals. The government’s 
goals include completing the project with minimal disruptions, within quality standards and with 
minimum cost. The private party supports these goals but additionally includes goals like dealing 
with minimum interference from the government and collecting enough profit during the 
operational phase (Rebeiz 2012). According to a World Bank report that studied over 60 projects 




interconnected parts: economic, politics and execution (World Bank Report February 2014). A 
project must prove a strong economic standing, political support from the right sectors/levels and 
an adequacy of preparatory work (such as feasibility study) in order to be successful. 
PPP projects were first introduced in the UK and amounted to £11 billion from 1992 to 
1999 (Li et al. 2005). As of 2012, over 550 PPP projects were signed in England alone worth £46 
billion (European PPP Expertise Center 2012). PPP projects have since then spread to developed 
countries as a way to benefit from private sector expertise and to manage risks. PPP has also 
spread to developing countries such as Egypt and has been increasing throughout the years. 
According to the World Bank, Egypt procured $23 billion dollars of investments in PPP projects 
from 1990 to 2013 and the number of new projects has been increasing since then (The World 
Bank Group 2014). These projects are bound to face risks especially with the political instabilities 
since 2011. In order to minimize their effects promptly, a model is needed that would map the 
risks in PPP projects and study interactions of parties involved in order to establish mitigation 
strategies. 
2.1.2 Parties involved 
There are a number of parties involved in PPP projects, which can be divided into internal 
and external or public and private. Common parties include: owner or government, developer, 
financier, sponsor, supplier, architect, subcontractors, contractors, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), media, authorities and regulatory bodies, politicians, workers, end-users 
and experts (Jooste and Levitt 2009). The private party can also either be a single firm offering 
construction and engineering services or can be a concession or consortium of firms such as 
construction, engineering, manufacturing, and financiers (Rebeiz 2012). This consortium is also 
referred to sometimes as a special purpose vehicle or SPV (Demirag et al. 2011). The public party 




Buser, 2006). Jooste et al. (2011) also introduced the classification of these parties as a ‘PPP 
enabling field’, which consists of the public, private and non-profit organizations that aim to 
promote the development of PPP projects. All these parties interact throughout the multiple 
phases of the projects in negotiations, clarifications of conflicts, opposition and decision-making. 
Zou (2012) divided relationships into the hard side consisting of contractual complexity and 






Table 2.1 Goals of Public Sector Vs. Private Sector 

Public Sector Private Sector 
Management 
Agent-principal relationship Vague and unclear Clear 
Focus/orientation Towards their own goals Towards the market 
Management style Reactive Proactive 
Level of constraint Politically constrained Less constrained 
Goals 
Clearness Not very clear at all times More clear, towards profit 
System style Closed Open and adaptable 
Orientation Input-focused Output-focused 
Labor 
Unionization High Low 
Salary Based on a system  Based on market and performance 




Communication Style Formal Less formal 
Communication Style Interactions through written memos Interactions more direct 
Level of sophistication of 
management systems Underdeveloped Developed and strong 
Nature and 
Location of Entity 
Location Geographically constrained Geographically unconstrained 
Orientation National International 
Diversification Limited Open and adaptable based on market 











PPP projects face several risks and interactions that are unique due to their different set-up. 
Different strategic and operating goals emerge due to the differences between the parties since 
one is publicly owned while the other is privately owned (Zou 2012). Table 2.1 shows a 
comparison between the public and private sectors with regards to their internal structure and 
goals. It can be seen that both parties have different outlooks in many areas such as management 
and goals. These differences may cause risks to manifest and even heighten the outcomes at 
times.  
According to the World Bank, poor risk management is one of the main reasons behind 
infrastructure project delays, which can be attributed to the relationship between the public and 
private sectors (Zhang 2005; Heravi and Hajihosseini 2012). The most important relationship in a 
PPP project is between the public and private sector and plays a massive role in the success or 
failure of the project (Zou 2012). External parties like the general public can also affect this 
relationship. The focus on interactions has been recently seen as an important and necessary shift 
from the focus on actors themselves (Helbing 2013; Naderpajouh and Hastak 2014). These 
interactions are pivotal in determining the progress of the project. An example is opposition from 
the public or through a media campaign, which can stop a project, or lead to extensive 
renegotiations whereas a project supported by the public or by NGOs can run more smoothly.  
2.1.3 PPP Types 
PPP projects include a combination of several phases including design, construction, 
finance, operation, maintenance and transfer. Hence, there are many variations under PPP 
contracts. These types vary in terms of the level of involvement of the government in financing 
and operation and the risk sharing between the parties. These variations are presented below (Ho 





- Procurement: in this form of delivery, the private party is contracted for the procurement phase 
only with the government controlling the project. This limits the involvement of the private party 
and the risks they assume. 
- Management: this form of project delivery is similar to the procurement form with the shifting 
of some operation processes to the private party. Adding more responsibilities to the private 
entity increases the risks they assume or share with the public entity. 
- Lease: the private party leases the infrastructure for a specific period. Risks assumed/shared by 
the private party are typically higher under leasing than in the previous types. 
- Concession: in this type of PPP delivery method, the private party is responsible for the design, 
construction, finance, operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and then transferring it 
back to the government at the end of the concession period. There are different variations to the 
concession such as: BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer), PFI (Private Finance Initiative), BTO, BOO 
(Build-Operate-Own), DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-Operate), DBOM (Design-Build-Operate-
Maintain). 
- Divestiture: in this delivery method, the private party fully controls the infrastructure as the 
ownership is transferred to it from the public sector. The public sector sells its shares or assets to 
the private entity, which is usually required to have a license to operate the asset. In case license 
is revoked (under a contract breach), the private entity can no longer own the asset and should sell 
it to a new operator.  
- Maintenance and operation contracts are usually used for existing facilities such as highways 
and trains or subway lines. Risks borne by the private entity are limited in this delivery method 
due to their limited involvement in the project. 
PPP projects can also be divided into two categories based on the project itself. They can 
either be new construction or maintenance and operation. New construction includes greenfield 





unused land whereas a brownfield project is constructed on a previously used land so demolition 
of the old structure is sometimes necessary. Examples of maintenance and operation contracts are 
highway projects. 
The European Commission divided PPP projects into two types: contractual PPP projects 
and institutionalized PPP projects (Martins et al. 2010).  Contractual PPP projects are those where 
both parties are bound by the contract only whereas in institutionalized PPP projects, both parties 
may join to form one entity and a different governance model is created (Martins et al. 2010).  
Institutionalization of PPP projects refers to the creation of a central government 
office/entity responsible for overseeing and promoting PPP projects through the formation of a 
PPP unit that aims to target projects that are proposed for delivery using PPP projects (Mrak 
2006). Benefits of having a PPP unit include aiding in negotiations between the public and private 
sector, decreasing transaction costs, creating standardized structures and procedures, acting as a 
liaison between the PPP project parties and both the general public and other ministries in the 
country. There are three types of institutionalization models: centralized, decentralized and mixed 
(Mrak 2006). In the centralized model, a new governmental entity is formed for addressing PPP 
projects so any new projects have to receive approval from it first. This can create problems since 
every ministry would have to go through this entity especially for funds. At the other end of the 
spectrum is the decentralized model where each ministry or government body deals with their 
own PPP projects. So the department of public works would be involved for a project under their 
sector. The most common model is the mixed model, which combines benefits from the other two 
models. Here a central PPP entity is created as well as an entity for each sector with the common 





2.1.4 Advantages of PPP projects 
Garvin (2010) discussed the opportunities and challenges of applying PPP projects for 
transportation in the United States. Ahmadjian and Collura (2012) presented a four-step process 
for assessing the benefits, costs, and other impacts associated with the use of PPP projects.  
When operated effectively and correctly, PPP projects can be successful and can lead to 
speedy project delivery and reduced costs. In the Express Lanes project in Orange County, 
California, the government saved $250M due to shifting the development, operation and 
maintenance to the private sector (Chhun 2014).  Table 2.2 shows some of the important 
advantages of using PPP as a delivery method as compiled from various literature. As shown, the 
main benefit is in introducing the private party to the project thus reducing the investment of the 






























Risk sharing with the private sector  X   X     X X 
Use of additional resources from the private sector   X   X   X   
Lower costs borne by public     X   X X   
Increased efficiency   X   X X X X 
Exposure to new techniques from the private sector   X X   X X   
Improve the delivery of services       X     X 
Utilize assets in a more efficient manner              X 
Probability of cost overruns is significantly lower X   X         
Long-term investment planning rather than short-term         X     
Higher value for money (compared to traditional 
contracting)   
X     X     
Relieve state funds   X X X       








2.1.5 Challenges associated with PPP projects 
There are a number of challenges that affect PPP projects worldwide such as opportunism, 
complexity of projects and lack of coordination, communication or trust between parties. These 
challenges can be divided into three areas: contractual, relational, and financial. 
Contractual: One challenge that affects PPP projects is incomplete contracts, which later 
manifests as a risk. MacNeil (1974) suggested a classification of contracts based on the level of 
completeness and divided them into classical, neoclassical and relational. Classical contracts are 
usually strict contracts that do not account for contingencies and are thus not commonly used for 
PPP projects (Chan 2010). Neo-classical contracts are an extension of the classical type with 
added benefits like risk scenarios and action and compensation plans which is a reason why this 
type of contract is widely used for PPP projects, since it addresses uncertainty. This type of 
contract includes some measures for avoiding or mitigating risks but does not include every 
possible scenario otherwise the added costs (i.e. costs related to making changes or additions to 
the contract) would be too high (Naderpajouh 2013). The last type, the relational contract 
provides a general outline of the terms of the relationship and does not include specifics so it 
relies on trust between parties and thus is not widespread in PPP projects (Chan 2010). Other 
contractual challenges include: (Ismail and Harris 2015, Ullah 2014) 
x Lack of guidelines pertaining to PPP projects 
x Lack of evaluation measures 
x Absence of clear roles of each party 
x Minimal involvement of the general public  
x Lengthy negotiations 
Relational: These challenges manifest due to the relationship between parties and their distinct 





orientations is a difficult task (Tiwari 2012). One important challenge is opportunism, which is 
described as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Ping et al. 2015). Opportunistic behavior can be 
instigated by the public, private or third parties. The private party may enter the contract through 
a low bid if they know that they can renegotiate later on and seek some of the amount they had 
initially cut off from their bid. They may also renegotiate throughout the project stages to gain 
more shares of the project and enhance their financial standing. According to Brux (2009) and 
Alcazar et al. (2002), the winner of the bidding process for a water concession project in Buenos 
Aires was the bidder who had the highest confidence in renegotiating the contract afterwards. The 
private party is usually confident in renegotiating if they feel the government is at a weaker 
position or is less knowledgeable. This weak position can be seen in case of approaching 
elections, instability of the relationship between the government and general public, 
government’s fear of project bankruptcy or public opinion, and inexperienced or naïve 
government. The second potential instigator is the government. According to Vernon (1971), the 
“obsolescing bargain” is the reason behind government-led renegotiations usually occurring after 
the construction period. After the construction is complete, the government is no longer as 
dependent on the private party as in the beginning of the project hence their agreement becomes 
obsolete or of less value to the government (Chan 2010).  This makes the government feel 
powerful during that stage and more likely to instigate renegotiations and think more 
opportunistically. The third probable party of opportunistic behavior is the third parties such as 
certain groups of interest or political opponents (Spiller 2008, Brux 2009). Lack of commitment 
and trust among parties is also a barrier to PPP projects. 
Financial: One challenge that faces many construction projects but can escalate in PPP projects 
due to its different set-up is cost overrun. Cost overruns were reported in many PPP projects and 
have reached 600% (NAO 1999a, Ahadzi and Bowles 2004). Debt is also usually encountered 





2.1.6 Cases of PPP failure 
Reside and Mendoza (2010) studied PPP projects in Asia and presented the number of 
failed projects per country with China having the highest number of 36 failed projects (out of 
727) followed by Indonesia with 11  (out of 83) and Malaysia with 7  (out of 104) failed projects. 
However, if we compare the percentage of failure with respect to the total number of projects, 
Indonesia’s percentage of failure would be the highest with 13.25% while China’s percentage 
would only be 4.95% (Reside and Mendonza 2010). An example is the NAIA 3 (Ninoi Aquino 
International Airport) terminal in the Philippines, which was a BOT project, signed in 2007 
(Reside and Mendoza 2010). A legal dispute arose between the contractor and government 
regarding the contract and escalated leading to the Philippine Supreme Court nullifying the 
contract and the contractor seeking arbitration from international organizations.  
Another case of project failure is the Da Chang WFOE (wholly foreign-owned enterprise) 
project that was for building a water treatment plant. In 2002, a few years after signing the 
contract, a change in the government policy aimed at changing the fixed rate of return led the 
private company to negotiate with the government to reach an agreement about the new changes 
(Choi et al. 2009). However, the negotiations failed and the private company sold its assets to the 
“Shanghai Shibei (Northern City) Water Treatment Corporation” (Choi et al. 2009). Hence, many 
renegotiations and projects fail due to the way different parties react to changes, propose changes 
and interact together.  
 
2.2 Risk Analysis  
2.2.1 Risks in PPP Projects 
According to Chhun (2014), the four factors that affect the efficiency of PPP projects are: 
economic, procurement, governance, and risk. Chhun (2014) has defined economics is an 





where the private entity usually arranges for the financing for the project through bank loans or 
pension funds. The second factor, procurement includes factors specifically related to the PPP 
procurement/delivery method. For example, opportunistic behavior of parties is a factor that 
plagues PPP projects, which often leads to contract renegotiation. Another example of 
opportunistic behavior is if the government cuts tariffs to secure votes in a reelection. In order to 
reduce these negative occurrences, parties seek to craft a contract that contains terms that would 
restrict these acts such as opportunistic behavior. However, it is extremely difficult, costly and 
almost impossible to include all contingencies in a contract thus some unspecified items remain 
that may lead way to a contract renegotiation by either party. This is referred to as a result of the 
incomplete contract problem. Many construction projects suffer from the incomplete contract 
issue, however, with PPP projects this can be magnified more due to the longer contract duration. 
Governance relates to the creation of agencies to establish and monitor each party’s role in a PPP 
project to maximize efficiency and minimize risk. The last factor is risk. Risks are prevalent in 
PPP projects and can emerge from the synergies between project participants (Chhun 2014).  
Risks that have affected PPP projects include default of the concessionaire in the Sydney 
Airport Rail Link project, refusal of the bank to loan the concessionaire in the Channel Tunnel 
Rail Link project in the United Kingdom and high interest loans on the private debt in the Taiwan 
High Speed Rail project, all of which forced the government to take charge of the projects 
(Dehornoy 2012). Another risk is low ridership during the operation phase as compared to the 
forecast, which faced the Seoul Airport Rail Link project (Dehornoy 2012). Lack of legislation is 
risk that faced the Poland A1 Toll Motorway project so it took seven years for the government 
and private to finally sign an agreement after having to make changes to the initial construction 
framework (Cuttaree 2008). Other contractual complexities caused problems for the Netherlands 
High Speed Railway Line project due to the complex contract signed (Cuttaree 2008). When 





handle these events. These types of risks/negotiations are the focus of this research in order to 
understand the synergies between parties and how to address the ensuing emergent issues that led 
to different project outcomes.  
Ashley and Bonner (1987) define political risk sources as a set of factors (i) stemming out of 
the firm itself: relationship of the firm to the government, local power groups and local businesses 
and (ii) outside factors affecting the firm: public attitude towards firm and project and other 
external factors. These are only one type of risks facing projects. Other risks include economic 
factors, social factors or regional. Risks can be divided according to type such as “planning and 
design, construction, accessibility, technological, performance, demand, financial, legal and force 
majeure” (Martins et al. 2010). Another method, which is followed in this research, is to divide 
risks according to the level that they occur in, either project, market or global level. Mahalingam 
(2010) divided nine important risks that face Indian PPP projects into three categories: 
institutional, organizational and project.  Table 2.3 below shows the risks affecting PPP projects 
that were collected through literature review. 
 
Table 2.3 Risks in PPP projects 
Risks in PPP Projects Area Source 
-Residual value risk 
-Technology risk 
-Tendering cost risks 
-Debt risk 
-Land acquisition risk 
PFIs Akintoye 
et al. 1998 
Political risks: 
-Unreasonable guarantees by the government 
-Decisions by local government official to satisfy their short-term 
needs that might oppose the local government’s long-term goals 
-Increase of the national debts 
-Dependence of investors on government’s promises 
-Corruption 








-Absence of national PPP law 
-Lack of standardized models for PPP projects 
-Poor decision-making of the public 
-Changes in construction regulations 
-Archaeological findings 
-Project’s financial attractiveness 
-Innovation in construction techniques 
-Cost overrun 
-Maintenance problems (such as need for more maintenance 
frequently) 
-Lack of coordination between parties 
-Improper distribution of responsibilities or authorities 
-Differences between parties in methods 







-Changes to policies regarding rates of return 
-Restrictions to refinancing schemes 
-Difficulty in changing tariffs/other agreement about price 
-Limited availability of domestic loans for long-term projects 
Water projects 
in China 
Choi et al. 
2009 
-Parties’ commitment 
-Parties’ risk management practices 
-Instability in the industry 
-Uniqueness of project 
-Complex project design 
-Complex project construction 
-Complex project operation/maintenance  
-Bidding competition 
-Duration of concession 
-Flexible project contract 
-Established dispute resolution mechanism  
-Inadequate regulations related to PPP infrastructures 














PPP projects in 
China 






-Poor decision-making in political areas 
-Ground conditions 
-Supply risks 
-Lack of competition in the bidding phase 
-Limited concession experience regarding PPP projects 
-Political reneging 
-“Macroeconomic fluctuations in currency/purchasing power” 
-Project governance 
-Lack of policies/legislation 
-Lack of trust between parties 
















-Tariff freeze for roadway projects 
-Policy volatility 
-Economic volatility 
-Contracting with local government instead of federal 
government 
-A small number of veto players in the government which would 
lead to volatility in decision-making, policymaking and 
investment decisions  
Infrastructure 






-Traffic revenue and demand forecast (transport projects) 
-Long-term preservation/maintenance of the asset 
-Regulatory risks 
-Life-cycle cost 
-Method for payment 
Transportation 






Researchers have agreed that risks should be assigned to the party better equipped at handling 
them. Risks assumed by the private party are those related to the phases in which it operates such 
as construction and operation activities while the public sector assumes risks related to political 





government would lead to volatility in decision-making, policymaking and investment decisions 
since a smaller number of people would be in control of the decisions so it would be easier to 
steer them in a certain direction. Contracting with the local government is riskier as opposed to 
contracting with the federal government, which has more experience and is more competent. This 
is seen in the case of higher project failures in China that are contracted with the local 
government (Reside and Mendoza 2010). Political instability can occur due to a number of 
reasons such as transitions between governments or political figures, lack of set/clear legislations 
or regulatory risks. 
2.2.2 ICRAM 
ICRAM-I, the “International Construction Risk Assessment Model” is a model that 
assesses risks for international projects by classifying risks into three categories: country, market 
and project levels. The three levels form a hierarchy with the country or macro level at the top 
followed by the market level and then the project level. Thus, the higher level, the country level, 
can impact the lower level, the market or project levels. ICRAM-1 contains seventy-three risks 
gathered through literature review and discussions with experts, which are put under the 
corresponding country, project or market level. The user then establishes weightings for each risk 
factor using a combination of the Analytic Hierarchy Process and the pairwise comparison 
method. The results of the analysis are high-risk indicators, risk analysis for the project and the 
impact of the country and market on the project (Hastak and Shaked 2000). Table 2.4 shows the 
73 risks presented in ICRAM-1.  
However, ICRAM is a general model for international projects and thus needs to be 
modified in order to address PPP projects specifically. It only identifies the risks associated with a 





interactions between parties to the risk and how these interactions might affect the risk outcomes 
(Naderpajouh 2013). Chapter 4 discusses the modified model, ICRAM-PPP. 
Table 2.4 Risks from ICRAM 
Hierarchy and Analysis of Macro (Country) Level Risk Indicators 
Operational 
risk 
Host government  
Political continuity 
Attitude toward foreign investors and profit 
Nationalization/expropriation 
Enforceability of contracts 
Government incentives 





Communication and transportation 




Hostilities with neighboring country or region 
Dependence on or importance of major power 
Internal causes 
Fragmented political structure 
Fractionalization by language, ethnic, and regional 
groups 
Restraints to retaining power 
Mentality, including nationalism, corruption, and 
dishonesty 
Social conditions (e.g., population density & wealth 
distribution) 
Symptoms of instability 
Societal conflicts (e.g., demonstrations, strikes, & street 
violence) 
Instability because of nonconstitutional changes 
Financial 
risk 
Legal framework  Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital 
Foreign exchange 
generation 
Current account balance 
Capital flow 
International reserves 
Foreign exchange reserves 
Gold and other reserves 
Foreign debt assessment 
Debt as GDP converted to U.S. dollars 






Extent of deficit/surplus 
Sources of revenue and major spending 
 
Hierarchy and Analysis of Construction Market Level Risk Indicators 
Technology 
Investor’s technological advantage 
Technology protection system 
Market suitability for advanced technology 
Availability of basic construction/ 




Type of partnership 
Types of contracts 
Enforceability of construction contract 
Procedure for bidding and design approvals 
Resources 
Availability and quality of local contractors 
Availability of construction materials 
Availability of skilled and unskilled workers 
Labor cost/productivity 
Availability of equipment and parts 
Financing 
Medium and long term financing for construction projects 
Tax and nontax incentives in construction industry 
Special construction industry index 
Business cultural 
differences 
Interaction of foreign management with local contractors 
A/E/C firms client or owner relationship 
Competitive/negotiated bidding 
Market potential 
Current market volume in core competency 
Future market volume in core competency 
Bidding volume index 
 
Hierarchy and Analysis of Project Level Risk Indicators 
Technology 
Problems in technology transfer and implementation 
Retention of technological advantage 
Contracts and 
legal issues 
Possibility of contractual disputes 
Problems in dispute settlement due to country’s laws 
Resources 
Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers 
Availability of special equipment 






Delay in design and regulatory approvals 
Defective design, error, and rework 
Work change order 
Difficulties to meet construction programs 
Unforeseen adverse ground conditions 
Quality 
Bad quality of materials 
Bad quality of workmanship 
Financial 
Financing difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions 
Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate 
Drop in project revenue 





Third party delays 
Safety 
Other 
Weather conditions and other natural causes of delay 
Physical damage to project by riots, terrorist act, and so forth 
 
 
Several case studies were collected to see the risks that impacted them. Table 2.5 shows three 
case studies and identifies risks that affected them. 
 
Table 2.5 Case studies where risks occurred 
Project Risks Reference 
Central Greece 
Motorway (E65) 
Ͳ Severe downgrade of sovereign debt 
Ͳ Decrease in traffic estimates 
Ͳ Change in governing party (delayed project signing by 
5 years) 
Ͳ Greek financial crisis 
Ͳ Lack of renegotiation clauses in the contract (led to a 3 
year renegotiation process) 
Ͳ Political instability 
Ͳ Leadership of the Public Works Ministry changed 5 
times during the renegotiation process 
Ͳ Complex decision-making process due to an added 
party to the structure resulting from the financial crisis 
(EU officials were involved in overseeing the 
restructuring process) 
Ͳ Change in project scope 
Ͳ Delay in land acquisition 
Roumboutsos et 
al. 2014 
Aegean Ͳ Economic crisis  






Motorway Ͳ Increase in toll fees  
Ͳ Increase in VAT  
Ͳ Insecurity in the employment sector 
Ͳ Drop in traffic and subsequently in revenue 
Ͳ Lower revenue than forecasted 
Ͳ Violations and non-payment from toll-users 
Ͳ Public unrest and demonstrations 
Ͳ Lack of liquidity of the financial institutions 
Ͳ Administrative delays (delayed the construction about 







Ͳ Weak regulator 
Ͳ Service expansion targets that were difficult to 
achieve 
Ͳ Political instability 







2.2.3 Renegotiations: Definition and Causes 
Parties enter into a partnership in order to deal with risks and uncertainties in the project 
jointly instead of having to rewrite the contract whenever a change occurs (Zou 2012). An 
important risk that is inevitable in projects is renegotiation. Renegotiations occur in PPP projects 
regardless of their sector, duration and location. A renegotiation can be defined as a change in the 
original contract signed by the parties. It is a severe risk that occurs in many projects and can be 
triggered by the occurrence of other risks. Examples of such triggers include modifications to the 
originally agreed upon contract terms such as reduction/increase in the level of service, contract 
extension, reduction/increase in tariffs and changes in the financial agreement (Guasch et al. 
2014). Other causes include changes in the risk-sharing mechanism between the parties and 
changes in project scope such as additions to the contract. However, in cases where changes are 
written in the contract, such as tariff adjustment they are not considered renegotiation cases 
(Guasch et al. 2014).  After renegotiation, both parties agree on a new contract with the added 





Renegotiations affect all parties such as the government, private sector and general public. 
Consequences of renegotiations include (Guasch et al. 2014): 
x Higher costs to the government  
x Loss of government credibility  
x Public opposition to changes made 
x Public boycotting the project  
Renegotiations can lead to an extension in contract duration, certain tax exemptions, or extra 
subsidy from the government (Ho 2006). Guasch et al. (2014) suggested that the average 
percentages of renegotiations occur in the construction phase 55% of the time and after the 
construction phase 45% of the time for the countries they studied. However, they did not give 
details as to when exactly they occurred or if it was a cascading risk or not. No previous research 
has focused on risk outcomes and if the risk was eliminated or resolved after the renegotiation or 
if caused more problems afterward. Renegotiations can either be seen as a risk that affects 
projects or as a consequence of other risks that occur. In this research, renegotiation is looked at 
as an outcome or consequence of other risks occurring.  
 
2.3 Scenario Planning 
A scenario is defined as a possible outcome of what might happen (Porter 1985, Chermack 2004, 
Bartholomew 2007). Scenario analysis is a method used to forecast future events based on a 
systematic process where the outcome is a “set of possible futures” (Schnaars 1987). According 
to Rachmatullah et al. (2007), scenario planning consists of three distinct phases: “writing, 
analysis and decision-making”. The first step, decision writing, consists of five steps as shown 






Figure 2.1 Steps needed to perform Scenario Planning 
 
Various researches have applied scenario planning in their studies to follow a systematic 
path. Rachmatullah et al. (2007) used scenario planning to create an electricity supply plan for 
Indonesia. Zegras at al. (2004) studied scenario planning for transportation planning. 
Bartholomew (2007) reviewed eighty scenario planning projects in “land-use transportation” and 
reported on its importance in engaging the public to receive their approval on the projects. 
Scenario planning is used in this research to look at all possible angles of a risk scenario and 
simulate them to look at patterns of outcomes and reach best scenarios. These scenarios are used 












2.4 Interactional Analysis 
2.4.1 Interactional Analysis applications in negotiations 
There are several modeling/simulation techniques available such as agent-based modeling, 
system dynamics and game theory. Table 2.7 shows some of the previous research conducted on 
negotiations using different modeling techniques.  
Table 2.7 Previous Research showing modeling techniques for negotiations 
Source Description of work 
De Clerck and 
Demeulemeester 
(2016) 
Used Game theory to depict a bidding model for a PPP project 
Zhu et al. (2016) Used bargaining game theory, time-dependent tactics, and a leaning 
approach to analyze the negotiation of debt terms between a bank and a 
sponsor in PPP projects  
Leu et al. (2014) Used Bayesian theory to analyze the opponent's historical offers and 
approximately predict the opponent's preference over procurement price 
negotiations 
Xiong and Zhang 
(2014)  
Used Time-Series models to develop a renegotiation framework and 
concession model to study “toll adjustment, contract extension, and 
annual subsidy” for PPP projects 
Carneiro et al. 
(2013)  
Applied case-based reasoning to propose an online dispute resolution 
mechanism in legal cases 
Xue et al. (2005) Proposed an agent-based multi-attribute negotiation framework for 
supply chain coordination issues. They also commented that simulating 





Sycara (1990) Used case-based reasoning and multi-attribute utility theory to model 
labor negotiations 
Zlotkin and 
Rosenschein (1989)  
Applied game theory to multi-agent negotiation 
 
Literature has agreed that the best method to model negotiations or interactions between 
parties is game theory. In this research, game theory has been chosen to apply interactional 
analysis because it is the optimal method to model interactions between parties as it focuses on 
actions and payoffs of players in a game. It is based on the interactions of parties in a situation 
where each of them has a set of actions/counter-actions that they can take. These actions dictate 
what their payoff is based on how the game proceeds. 
Game theory frameworks or models consist of three main aspects: “players, strategies and 
payoffs” (Glumac et al 2015). Game theory can be used to portray the opponents’ behavior, 
strategy and payoff for each move they make (Ho 2006). It can be used to solve situations of 
conflict by estimating the “equilibrium point of conflict” (Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008). It 
can portray both competitive and cooperative behavior of players. Game theory has been used in 
various fields such as psychology, economics and political science. Parsons and Wooldridge 
(2002) state seven important properties of frameworks for multi-agent interactions: 
x Guaranteed success: when an agreement is ensured to happen. This is reached through 
Nash equilibrium in game theory where Nash equilibrium represents the best-case 
solution for all parties so they do not have any incentive to deviate from it. 
x Maximizing social welfare: when the negotiation result maximizes the aggregate utility 





x Pareto efficiency: occurs in the absence of another outcome that would increase an 
actor’s utility without reducing another actor’s utility 
x Individual rationality: when rationality of all actors’ is the best strategy for all of them to 
play. 
x Stability: such as Nash Equilibrium. 
x Simplicity: when an actor can easily reach the best strategy easily. 
x Distribution: occurs when the framework reduces communication among actors. 
Several authors (Asgari et al. 2014, Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008, Madani 2010, 
Madani and Lund 2011, Parsons and Wooldridge 2002, Samsura et al. 2009, Zlotkin and 
Rosenschein 1989) proposed the use of game theory in various negotiations settings to analyze 
and portray parties’ behaviors. Asgari et al. (2014) proposed a game theory framework to model 
resource sharing and management among subcontractors. Naderpajouh et al. (2014) used game 
theory to model social opposition to infrastructure projects. Madani (2010) applied game theory 
to address conflicts in managing water resources. Samsura et al. (2009) used game theory to 
model the behavior of actors in situations of decision-making related to land development. It can 
be seen that game theory has been an important and effective technique in identifying the effects 
of interactions between actors on the collective decision-making process in diverse settings. 
However, all these researches have only looked at two-party interactions. 
2.4.2 Interactional Analysis applications in PPP Projects  
Interactional analysis can be defined as the study of interactions between actors in a system 
(Naderpajouh 2013). The focus is on emergent dynamics that transpire due to synergies between 
different actors. It is based on power relations, where potential actions of one party exercise 
control over opposing party. Interactional analysis has been used in other areas, which are mainly 





objects (such as technology) or other people in certain situations. Interactional analysis involves 
the study of the actions of different parties in a situation and how the relationship between parties 
manifests through these actions and affects the process and outcome of a risk/negotiation. 
Interactions can either be due to contractual or informal governance (Zou 2012). Zheng et al. 
(2008) reflect that the dynamics of the relationship between parties affects how contracts are 
executed throughout project stages.  
Interactional analysis, through game theory has also spread to engineering where it is 
used in bidding, negotiations, dispute resolution, and water resource allocation problems 
(Mahjouri and Ardestani 2010). Game theory shows “interactions between self-interested agents” 
that act rationally to maximize their utility values. (Parsons and Wooldridge 2002). In a game, 
each player has certain choices, a strategy for making these choices and a utility value or payoff 
for each choice or outcome (Scharle 2002). Players are assumed to be rational aiming at 
maximizing their payoff through their strategy. Many definitions of PPP projects exist such as 
“management reform, risk shifting, restructuring public service and power-sharing” (Scharle, 
2002). Among these definitions, power sharing is the closest to game theory concepts since it 
aims to foster cooperative relations and balanced partnerships. The outcome of a game is the 
strategy chosen by the player and his payoff from using this strategy. The payoff or utility of a 
player is a number that is based on the possible return received from choosing a specific strategy. 
This payoff is reduced when actors take informal or formal actions. Informal actions are defined 
as: political/media/public pressure, work stoppages, and threats. They are also referred to as 
relational approaches since they depend of the dynamics between the parties (Caldwell et al. 
2009). Formal actions are defined as: law suits, licensing challenges, legal actions, formal notices 
and claims/disputes (Naderpajouh et al. 2014). Since the parties have different structures and 
objectives, they also have different evaluation metrics for the utility values, which might then 





Several authors (Ho 2006, Chen et al. 2012, Kennedy 2013, Glumac et al 2015, Kargol 
and Sokol 2007, Scharle 2002, Shen et al. 2007, Zou and Kumaraswamy 2009) proposed the use 
of game theory in renegotiation settings to analyze and portray parties’ behaviors. Scharle, (2002) 
emphasized the importance of the gaming perspective to understand PPP projects. Kargol and 
Sokol  (2007) presented a descriptive method in order to link the theoretical aspects of PPP to 
game theory. Zou and Kumaraswamy (2009) presented a basic summarized theoretic approach 
for understanding risk allocation in PPP projects in terms of which action to assume, take or 
transfer a risk. Chen et al. (2012) presented a game theory model to analyze the Taiwan High 
Speed Railroad project to examine how developers implement different strategies during project 
stages to alter the contract's conditions in order to continually create competitive advantage after 
they have been awarded the contract. Ho (2006) provided a framework to show government 
behavior towards distressed projects and when they rescue them or let the concessionaire claim 
bankruptcy. Kennedy (2013) applied the model developed by Ho (2006) to “Metronet - London 
Underground PPP” project. Glumac et al. (2015) applied a game theory experiment to brownfield 
PPP projects in three cases of negotiations: “building claim, future land use and reparcelling of 
the land” to solve the issue of forming a joint venture company between the developer and 
government or not. Shen et al. (2007) applied a game theory model to show the bargaining 
behavior of the public and private in negotiating a concession period. No previous research has 
looked into modeling scenarios of high risks in PPP projects, and none have addressed three-party 
interactions. This dissertation proposes a framework for three-party interactional analysis using 
game theoretic concepts. 
An important pillar of a PPP project is the interactions of the parties. Although these 
parties share mutual interdependence during project delivery phases for a successful project, they 
do not always cooperate in every decision. In each decision, there are multiple parties involved 





resolution of a decision or risk. Blockuis et al. (2012) focused on conflicts and cooperation 
between parties in redevelopment projects to analyze decision-making in urban projects. An 
example they use is the interaction between the municipality and established company in a certain 
area to decide on a redevelopment project. Table 2.8 discusses a railway project in Melbourne, 
Australia.  
 
Table 2.8 Interactional risks in a PPP project: Passenger rail services in Melbourne, Australia 
Risk Party 1 Party 2 Outcome 





Difficulty in negotiations on pending 
contractual issues  
Change in political arena 
and/or because the union’s 





Failure of the new operators to 
negotiate sufficient productivity 
improvements with staff 
Arrangement flaws e.g. for 
inter-operator and intermodal 






Disputes, aggravated by problems 
with the ticketing system itself, caused 
a serious distraction of management 
and officials’ time 
Having two concessions with 
some shared infrastructure in 






Inability to draw from each other’s 
fleets at times of vehicle shortage, 
difficulty in arranging to use each 
other’s platforms, disputes about the 
maintenance of common electrical 
overhead and signaling, and 
distraction of management time 
dealing with interfaces and disputes. 






Negotiations with the Government 
which led to a one-off additional 





Concession (National Express) took a 
write-off of the order of A$300 
million including forfeit of their 
performance bond. Its concession was 
then managed by an administrator, 










Project was signed to other 
concessionaire (Connex) and 
Government took back some of the 
revenue risks by agreeing to top 
revenue up if it fell below a threshold, 
and requiring a sharing of profit above 
an upper threshold and reduced 
concession period. 
New government decision to 
undertake a major upgrading 
of the infrastructure to 





Caused contractual complexities and 




The second project to be discussed is the Vasco da Gama Bridge Project (The Lusoponte 
Concession). It is one of the earliest PPP projects in Portugal that links the urban part of Lisbon to 
the South Bank and has a length of 17.2 km intended to reduce congestion off of the existing 25th 
of April Bridge (Cruz and Marques 2013). The contract was a Design-Build-Operate-Finance for 
30 years with an 867 million euro original investment and was signed in 1994 to the Lusoponte 
Concession with construction beginning 2 years later and the bridge being open in 1998 (Cruz et 
al. 2014). The Portuguese Government created Gattel, a governmental agency under the Ministry 
of Public Works that has ties to the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Planning to 
monitor and coordinate the project (Lemos et al. 2004). From 1995 to 2000, the project was 
renegotiated 6 times and Financial Renegotiation Agreements (FRA) were reached. 
As shown in Table 2.9, six renegotiations took place from 1995 to 2008. The first 
renegotiation occurred due to the strong public opposition to the increase in tolls for the existing 
“25th of April” Bridge. The result of this renegotiation was several changes to the existing 
agreement such as the introduction of discounts for frequent users and fixing of prices for the 





changes made in the first agreement. This cascading risk affected both parties and led the 
government to compensate the concessionaire several times. The compensations varied in amount 
from 3.9M € to 306.1M € adding up to 490.4M € in total. 
 
Table 2.9 Vasco da Gama Bridge Project Renegotiation Reasons and Results (Pinto 2012) 




Increase in toll fares of the 25th of 
April Bridge led to public protest 
which became violent and had an 
impact on the public opinion to the 
new project. 
Changes introduced by the Government:
-Discounts for frequent users of the 25th of April 
Bridge 
-No fare payment for the month of August from 
1996 to 1998. 
-Fixing of toll prices for the 25th of April Bridge
-Revenue from the 25th of April Bridge was to be 
dealt with differently than previous
-Higher risk due to the public opposition
FRA requested by Lusoponte Concession:
- 90.4M € awarded to the concession
-Shifting of risks to increase government 
responsibility in the case of rescission of the 
contract and government liability to provide a 
settlement in case similar public opposition occurs 




Changes in the contract due to FRA I 
that was introduced by the 
Government. (Main reason was the 
fixing of toll fares) 
A settlement of 4.9M € to the concession. 
FRA (III) 
February, 
17 1997  
Changes in the contract due to FRA I 
that was introduced by the 
Government. (Main reason was the 
no-fare-payment for August 1996 and 
1997). 




Changes in the contract due to FRA I 
that was introduced by the 
Government. (Main reason was the 
no-fare-payment for August 1998). 




A Global Agreement between parties 
to enforce FRA I to the remainder of 
the contract duration and prevent 
reoccurrence of FRA’s II-IV. 
-New distribution of risks 
-Changing the Base Case to project the current 
concessionaire situation after the FRA’s 





instead of the previous flexible rule of a maximum 
of 30 years (to reach 2.250 million vehicles) 
-New financing conditions 




Additional clauses to the previous 
Global Agreement in VI  
-Concession refunds the extra generated money 
due to the changes in the Income tax 
-Concessionaire compensates government for the 
non-construction of the Gattel Building 
-Compensation of the government to the 
concessionaire for the discounts the government 
made to the users 
-Compensation of 22M € to the concessionaire  
*FRA: Financial Renegotiation Agreement 
 
Table 2.10 shows a comparison of the contract after the fifth negotiation as compared to 
the initial contract. The changes that were made in all renegotiations were in favor of the 
Lusoponte concession because they received several direct compensations from the government 
as well as risk sharing of financial and demand risks, which were previously allocated solely to 
the Lusoponte concession.  
 
Table 2.10 Results of Renegotiations in the Vasco da Gama Bridge Project (Pinto 2012, Cruz and 
Marques 2013) 
Contract item Initial Contract (1995) Contract after Renegotiation V 
(2000) 
Tolls Tolls to be the same for both bridges Tolls are different for both bridges 
Government 
investment 100M € 306.1M € 
Contract 
duration 
Flexible, up to 2.250 million vehicles 
with a maximum of 33 years Fixed number of years: 35 years 
Demand risk Assumed by Lusoponte concession Shared between Lusoponte concession and Government 
Financing risk Assumed by Lusoponte concession Shared between Lusoponte concession and Government 
 
 





a. Political risks: there was political unrest after the contract was signed where the 
Government’s orientation changed from Social Democrat to Socialist which was later 
replaced by a new Socialist Government (Lemos et al. 2004). This inconsistency in the 
government aggravated the interactions between parties during negotiations because the 
concession was forced to deal with more than one partner at times and also try to find a 
common ground with their changing political views (Lemos et al. 2004). The concession was 
also contractually bound to perform feasibility studies for a new bridge although the 
government had not yet made a decision whether to go through with this project or not. 
b. Financial risks: interest rates increased 7-8% in 1993 during the bidding period to 11-12% in 
1995 which negatively affected the project’s Internal Rate of Return (Lemos et al. 2004).  
c. Design risk: Gattel made several changes to the preliminary design that led to delays in the 
approvals due to the need to coordinate between several authorities (Lemos et al. 2004).  
d. Traffic risk: it can have a huge impact on a roadway project since it can reduce revenue and 
cause financial instability for the concession. In March 2000, the government increased fuel 
prices, which led to a reduction in traffic levels for two months before resuming to the initial 
level (Lemos et al. 2004).  
e. Operation/Maintenance risks: are affected by traffic and the rate of accidents for the existing 
25th of April bridge. 
f. Legal risks: changes in laws or taxation were fully assumed by the concession 
g. Environmental risks: EU funds were suspended due a suspected violation of the 
Environmental Impact Study (EIS) but were resumed when the Portuguese Government 
signed an agreement with the EU on an accepted EIS (Lemos et al. 2004).   
h. Social risks: Expropriation was a social risk that faced the Vasco da Gama project. Out of the 
350 areas of land to be expropriated, 250 were settled and 100 had to go to court where some 





Interactions in the Vasco da Gama Bridge 
There are several parties involved in a PPP project but the main parties in a renegotiation 
are the Government and the Concessionaire. These two parties engaged in several phases of 
renegotiations in order to reach an agreed upon contract to guide the remaining duration of the 
project. 
               
 
Figure 2.2 Timeline of Negotiations for the Vasco da Gama Project 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the timeline for negotiations throughout the project along with the 
actors involved in each negotiation. In all renegotiations, the Government and the Concessionaire 
are the actors interacting to reach a Financial Renegotiation Agreement. However, the first 
renegotiation was triggered by an outside party, the general public whose protests led to FRA I 
and the effects of this FRA continued to affect the project and led to the occurrence of the rest of 
the 5 FRA’s. The Vasco da Gama project is an example of how a trigger from a third (and non-
contractual) party can affect a project throughout its phases from the start of construction through 





2.4.3 Three-Party Interactional Analysis 
Game theory is a mathematical technique that addresses interactions between decision-makers in 
conflict or negotiation situations (Fisk 1984). These games can either be simultaneous or 
sequential. In construction-related areas, the games are usually sequential where the actors take 
turns making choices. For each choice, there is a payoff per actor and transaction cost. 
Transaction costs are incurred when taking an action such as filing a claim. Sequential games are 
depicted in game trees to show the sequence of actions taken by each actor and the payoffs 
obtained at each level. More details will be explained about this in the coming section. 
Previous research has shown the application of interactional analysis through game theory in 
two-party scenarios. Expanding beyond two parties has not been addressed as it adds complexity 
in the scenario. In a two-party scenario, actor A takes an action, which is followed by an action 
from actor B, then actor A acts again and so on. For a game where the parties are assumed to take 
a maximum of 4 actions (where both parties can perform informal actions followed by formal 
actions), the game would proceed as follows: 
x Actor A Æ Actor B Æ Actor AÆ Actor B 
The actions are unilateral, in the sense that the two actors take turns making decisions and 
taking actions until the issue is resolved. There are no other possible iterations for it since an actor 
will take an action then waits for their opponent to respond. This is similar to two players in a 
chess game. Game theory calculates the Nash equilibrium for such a game based on the possible 
payoffs they would receive.  
Adding a third party would increase the number of possible scenarios between the actors. 
Assuming that actor A would take the first action, there would be 8 possible scenarios, which are 
shown below:  
1. Actor A Æ Actor B Æ Actor C Æ Actor A 





3. Actor A Æ Actor C Æ Actor B Æ Actor A 
4. Actor A Æ Actor C Æ Actor B Æ Actor C 
5. Actor A Æ Actor B Æ Actor A Æ Actor C 
6. Actor A Æ Actor B Æ Actor A Æ Actor B 
7. Actor A Æ Actor C Æ Actor A Æ Actor C 
8. Actor A Æ Actor C Æ Actor A Æ Actor B 
However, not all these scenarios would be plausible and real since there are contractual 
relationships that would limit certain actions. For example, in the case of the Tanzania Railway 
Project, the union requested salary increase that was previously promised by the government 
before the concessionaire was signed. The actors are: 
Actor A: Tanzania Railways Association of Worker Union 
Actor B: Concessionaire  
Actor C: Government of Tanzania 
In this case, Actor A (union) always has to go to actor B (concessionaire) first to request 
the salary increase since the contractual relationship is between union workers and the 
concessionaire. The next action would be by Actor B (concessionaire) to actor C (government) 
where B could negotiate with C to provide subsidy for the salary increase they promised. In this 
case four scenarios (numbers 3, 4, 7 and 8) are not plausible so they should be removed as shown 
below. 
1. Actor A Æ Actor B Æ Actor C Æ Actor A 
2. Actor A Æ Actor B Æ Actor C Æ Actor B 
3. Actor A Æ Actor C Æ Actor B Æ Actor A 
4. Actor A Æ Actor C Æ Actor B Æ Actor C 
5. Actor A Æ Actor B Æ Actor A Æ Actor C 





7. Actor A Æ Actor C Æ Actor A Æ Actor C 
8. Actor A Æ Actor C Æ Actor A Æ Actor B 
Three-player games in literature have been limited to simultaneous games where players 
choose strategies at the same time without knowing what strategies the other players chose. They 
only show an empirical approach of the simultaneous game where payoffs for each player were 
assumed to be a specific number and shown in a payoff matrix in order to calculate the Nash 
equilibrium. 
Table 2.11 shows a sample payoff matrix for a 2–person simultaneous game. This graphical 
form is also denoted as the “normal form” of a game. In this game, there are 4 possible 
combinations of outcomes where the players either choose action 1 or 2. Player A is depicted on 
the left while player B is on the top. For each action, a player has a payoff denoted by their letter 
followed by action taken and a roman numeral. For example, A1i is the payoff for player A when 
he takes action 1 and i denotes the first game. In the context of construction one of the actions for 
player A could be refusing to pay and an action for player B could be filing a claim.  
Table 2.11 Payoff Matrix for a 2-person game 
  Player B 
  Action B1 Action B2 
Player A 
Action A1 (A1i,B1i) (A1ii, B2i) 
Action A2 (A2i,B1ii) (A2ii,B2ii) 
 
In order to address 3-player simultaneous games, the third party is added, which doubles 
the combinations of outcomes from only four to eight as shown in Table 2.12. The payoffs for 
each game are written between brackets with the order: player A payoff, player B payoff, player 
C payoff. The notation A1i means payoff of player A when he takes action 1 and i represents the 





same assumption that each player has a set of 2 possible actions, Action 1 or 2 (which are the 
same for all players) and that they all choose an action at the same time.  
 
 
Table 2.12 Payoff Matrix for a 3-person game 
  Player C Player C 
  Action C1 Action C2 
  Player B Player B 





(A1i,B1i,C1i) (A1ii, B2i, C1ii) (A1iii,B1iii,C2i) (A1iv,B2iii,C2ii) 
Action 
A2 
(A2i,B1ii,C1iii) (A2ii,B2ii,C1iv) (A2iii,B2iii,C2iii) (A2iv,B2iv,C2iv)
 
The difference between this 3-person game and 2-person game in terms of payoff matrix 
is the addition of the third person (player C) on the top. This denotes that a dichotomy of 
outcomes; the first scenario is when player C chooses action 1 so the other two players can each 
separately choose action 1 or 2 producing 4 possible outcome combinations. The strategy 
combinations for the players in order would be: 
x Action 1, Action1, Action 1 
x Action 1, Action2, Action 1     
x Action 2, Action1, Action 1   
x Action 2, Action2, Action 1     
The second scenario is when actor C chooses action 2 so again the other two actors can 
choose between action 1 and 2. The strategy combinations for the players in order would be: 





x Action 1, Action2, Action 2     
x Action 2, Action1, Action 2   
x Action 2, Action2, Action 2     
Each of these strategies has a unique payoff for each player as denoted in Table 2.12. These 
normal form games only depict simultaneous games. However, the actual cases with regards to 
PPP projects are not simultaneous games. One main reason is that in real PPP projects the actions 
of players are sequential and not simultaneous. In the case of a two-player game, one player (for 
example, government) takes an action against another player (concessionaire) and the 
concessionaire then reacts to this action. The game then goes on between both players. In case 
three-player games, the scenario is expanded to include three players in the sequential game. 
Sequential games are shown using the “extensive form”, which is a game tree that shows the 
sequence of actions by parties. A simplification of this game tree is shown below to show two 










Figure 2.3 Simplified Game Tree  
 






2.4.4 Gaps in Literature 
Based on the literature review that was conducted, the following gaps in literature were 
discovered: 
x Lack of a comprehensive risk registry for PPP projects 
x Lack of a model to quantify all risks and provide high risk that affect a PPP project  
x Many researches have focused on calculating the percentage of renegotiations per 
country/region (Guasch 2004, Woodhouse 2006, Engel et al. 2009, Reside and Mendoza 
2010 and Bitran et al. 2012) and have not looked into risks behind them and the process 
that occurs 
x Lack of assessment of emergent risks through modeling of interactional dynamics 
x Lack of three-party analysis  
x Lack of simulation frameworks to model different scenarios and investigate the impact of 
different mitigation strategies 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the literature review related to the dissertation. It presented a review of 
literature on PPP projects, risks facing them and provided a glimpse of interactional analysis, 
which is applied in this dissertation. A detailed explanation and case study for ICRAM-PPP is 
discussed in chapter 4 and the explanation and case study for interactional analysis is addressed in 
chapter 5. It can be concluded that PPP projects have seen an increase in use over the years but 
have also been affected by many risks. These risks can lead to contract renegotiation or even 
project failure. This dissertation aims to address these risks through interactional analysis. The 
first step would be discovering high risks in a project, which would then be used to create risk 












3.1 Research Framework 
The previous section presented literature review on topics including advantages of using PPP 
projects as a delivery method, parties involved in a PPP, risks affecting these PPP projects and 
how these risks lead to renegotiations or failures of the projects. The role that the interaction of 
parties plays in affecting the resolution of risks has not been previously addressed in other 
researches despite its imminent importance. 
  PPP projects are a unique venture since they involve a multitude of parties contractually 
involved for the delivery of a project over a long duration. PPP projects also involve outside 
parties that can have a direct influence on the project. This adds complexity to the risk scenarios. 
In order to find the best strategies for risks in PPP projects, high risks need to be identified, the 
phases in which they occur need to be mapped and finally an analysis of the actions of parties in 
these high risks undertaken. This chapter discusses the methodology approach for this 
dissertation. It starts by discussing systematic literature review (SLR), which is performed to 
collect all risks affecting PPP projects in order to modify ICRAM-1 and create ICRAM-PPP. 
After ICRAM-PPP is created, scenario analysis is used to create scenarios for the high risks. 
Interactional analysis is presented which is based on the scenarios created. Finally, simulation of 





3.2 Systematic Literature Review  
Systematic literature review (SLR) is a method to answer a question in a study using a systematic  
approach where all related data is looked into. It consists of three main steps: plan, perform and 
report (Brereton et al. 2007). Systematic literature review has been famous in contexts such as 
software engineering (Barcelos and Travassos 2006, Brereton et al. 2007, Beecham et al. 2008, 
Jørgensen and Shepperd 2007, Kitchenham et al. 2009, Turner et al. 2010) and recently in 
infrastructure (Roehrich, Lewis and George 2014). 
In the planning phase, a protocol needs to be established which is followed throughout the 
rest of the systematic literature review stages. This protocol is a detailed description of the 
method to be followed, data to be collected, how the analysis will proceed and how validation 
will take place.  Various literature sources that propose a process for SLR (Kitchenham 2004 and 
Leuderitz et al. 2016) were studied and a final process was established. Figure 3.1 shows the 
process taken to perform a SLR.  
1. Plan: the first stage and involves the planning of the SLR process. The first step is 
identifying the objectives of the study and framing the research questions. This step is 
important because it initiates the study and is the basis for the remaining work. The next 
step is creating the protocol based on the research questions. This protocol identifies how 
the following items will be addressed: 
x How the questions will be answered 
x Sources for acquiring articles 
x How the search will proceed 
x How the articles will be chosen 
x How the analysis will be performed 





These steps will be followed throughout the SLR process therefore it is imperative to 
create a protocol that encompasses all areas of the research and it reviewed and updated 
constantly in case any changes occur. 
2. Perform: the second stage and involves applying the protocol previously established in 
the planning stage. The “perform” stage consists of two steps. The first step is identifying 
sources for information, which include ASCE library, Science Direct and other search 
engines. Once these sources are identified, articles/books are acquired and narrowed 
down in the second step according to the predetermined criteria. Criteria are chosen for 
how to narrow down the list of articles and only include those that are relevant to the 
study. After reaching a final set of articles, the next stage starts. 






















Figure 3.1 Stages of Systematic Literature Review 
 
SLR has been used in various fields but has not been common in civil engineering, 
specifically in construction engineering and management. This dissertation highlights the 
usability and benefits from using the SLR approach in construction engineering and management 
by applying it to collect all risks pertaining to PPP projects. After collecting all risks in PPP 
projects, ICRAM-1 is modified to create ICRAM-PPP. This is performed through removing all 
risks in ICRAM-1 that do not pertain to PPP projects, adding new ones from the SLR process and 
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application of ICRAM-PPP to the Indiana Toll Road project as well as the Tanzania Railway 
project. Applying ICRAM-PPP gives an output that is quantification of risks in the project and 
identification of high risks. These high risks are then used to create risk scenarios and model them 
using interactional analysis. These risk scenarios are created using scenario planning as discussed 
in the next section.  
3.3 Scenario Planning  
Literature review discusses the different uses of scenario planning according to a number of 
literature sources (Munoz 1998, Munoz and Sussman 1999; Zegras, et al. 2004). In this 
dissertation, scenario planning is conducted through five steps. These steps are discussed below 
for the formation of risk scenarios for this research. 
Step 1: Identify scope 
The scope of this section/research is to understand dynamic outcome of the associated risk in a 
PPP project because of the actions taken by the parties to the risk. 
Step 2: Identify factors affecting the outcome and rank them 
The factors that affect the outcomes are the risks that manifest in PPP projects. Examples of these 
risks include: opportunistic behavior of one of the parties to the PPP project, union discontent 
with current conditions, opposition to the project or delivery mode, recession, incorrect demand 
projections, inaccuracy of specifications or contract documents, etc. Ranking of these 
factors/risks can be obtained from ICRAM-PPP and prioritized according to the resulting 
weighted assessment per risk. From this prioritization, one risk is chosen for further analysis. 
Step 3: Identify driving forces that affect the factors (from step 2) 
The driving forces that affect the factors or risks are the actions taken by each party that lead to 
escalation or resolving of the issue. These actions can either be formal or informal where informal 
actions include political/public/media pressures, threats of suing or contacting a party to 





and claims. Both informal and formal actions have transaction costs that vary with formal actions 
being higher than informal actions. 
 
Step 4: Develop combinations of the driving forces that lead to scenarios 
Different combinations of driving forces (outcomes) lead to the creation of different scenarios. 
These scenarios must be realistic and reflect a possible and plausible scenario. 
Step 5: Create scenarios  
The different scenarios created from step 5 are looked into in order to eliminate scenarios that are 
not realistic.  
Scenario for Risk #1: Opportunistic behavior, new government’s opposition to PPP projects, 
inadequate specifications led to private party requesting subsidy from the government. This is 
rejected by the government, which leads to renegotiation. End result is that the project is 
transferred back to the government. 
Scenario for Risk #2: Union request salary increase which leads to a meeting between the 
government and private, however, no decision is made. Union workers go on strike so the 
government decides to contribute to the salary increase.  
These scenarios are then translated into a game using game theoretic concepts and payoffs are 
calculated for each outcome. The next section discusses interactional analysis used to model these 
dynamics. 
 
3.4 Delphi Technique 
The Delphi technique was developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s to create a method 
aimed at conducting an analysis to achieve consensus about a specific topic (Dalkey 1972). It 
avoids the problems that emanate from group dynamics since the participants are geographically 





judgment in a specific area in a “controlled environment” (Hallowell 2009). Studies showed that 
the average of a group decision is usually higher than the average of individual’s responses thus 
asserting the use of a Delphi technique (Okoli and Pawlowski 2015). Participants are targeted and 
their identities kept anonymous. The Delphi technique usually consists of 2-4 iterations, although 
many researchers recommend 3 iterations (Cyphert and Gant 1971; Brooks 1979; Ludwig 1994 
and 1997; and Custer, Scarcella, and Stewart 1999), where the same participants are targeted and 
sent the survey information. A description of the rounds is presented below (Kerlinger 1973, Hsu 
and Sandford 2007): 
x Round 1: usually consists of the data collection phase where the participants are asked a 
question relating to the study to gather their input. A modification to this is if there is 
availability of data from extensive literature review so the first round consists of a 
questionnaire based on the collected data. 
x Round 2: the participants are sent a questionnaire where they have to provide input such 
as ranking of data. They are given a timeframe to return the questionnaire by. Once all 
questionnaires are returned they can be analyzed and round 3 can commence. All 
participants remain anonymous throughout all rounds and only the researchers can 
identify them. 
x Round 3: data that is collected in the previous round is analyzed and the questionnaire is 
modified based on this information. The modified questionnaire is sent again to the 
participants along with a summary of the results of round 2 to revise their answers (if 
necessary). This iteration serves the purpose of narrowing down the data, getting 
participants’ opinion on it and reaching an agreement about it. If there is still huge dissent 






There is disagreement among researchers regarding the optimum number of participants to 
include in the study. Sourani and Sohail (2015) recommend a minimum of seven to eight 
participants, Mitchell and McGoldrick (1994) suggest a minimum of eight to ten while Delbecq, 
Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975) recommend ten to fifteen participants as an optimal number. 
Hallowell and Gambatese (2010) recommend a minimum of eight participants and state that most 
studies have on average eight to sixteen participants but recommend that this depends on the 
subject matter itself and the availability of experts. According to Ludwig (1997), majority of the 
studies used fifteen to twenty participants. Table 4.3 lists previous Delphi studies with the number 
of participants, rounds and description of research. The number of participants and rounds chosen 
should depend on the topic of research, availability of experts and number of rounds required for 














15-30 Review of literature on procedure and features of 
the Delphi process 
Xu, Chan, and Yeung 
(2010) 
 
34 (2) Developing a Fuzzy Risk Allocation Model 
for PPP Projects in China 
Streveler et al. (2003) 35 (4) Using a Delphi Study to Identify difficult concepts 
for in Thermal and Transport Science for students 
Okoli and Pawlowski 
(2004) 
 
10-18 * 4 The Delphi method as a research tool: an example, 
design considerations and applications 
Yeung, Chan and  Chan 
(2009)  
 
22 (4) Created a model to assess relationship-based 
projects in construction though the use of KPIs 
Rossouw, Hacker, and 
de Vries (2011) 
32 (3) Concepts and contexts in engineering and 
technology education: an international and 
interdisciplinary Delphi study 
Chan et al. (2014) 108 (2) Ranked risk factors in PPP water projects in China 
Ameyaw and Chan 
(2015a) 
40 (2) Ranked risk factors in water infrastructure PPP 
projects in Ghana. 
Ameyaw, and Chan 
(2015b)  
40 (2) Evaluated risk factors for water PPP projects in 
Ghana 
Austin, Pishdad-
Bozorgi and de la Garza 
(2015) 
55 (3) Identified and ranked best practices in Flash Track 
projects. 
(They were asked to reconsider the 20 practices on 
which they had not reached consensus on in Round 
1, plus the four additional practices proposed by 
them in Round 1, along with the corresponding 
anonymous comments from Round 1) 





The first case study looked at the use of Delphi in 
research related to sustainable construction.  
The second case looked at the benefits of students’ 
use of Delphi in research projects. 
Tymvios and 
Gambatese (2016) 
17 (3) Use of Delphi to identify the target group and target 
method that is interested in “Prevention through 
Design” which aims at mitigating design hazards to 
workers and facilities. 
   
 
Sourani and Sohail (2015) promote the use of the Delphi technique in risk management due to the 
lack of an agreed understanding of risk management in construction projects. The Delphi 





literature review process and create a reliable registry. This (Delphi) technique uses the expertise 
of the participants to create a risk registry for PPP projects that can assess risks under three levels: 
macro, market and project. Details on how this technique was applied and the results obtained are 
presented in Chapter 4. 
 
3.5 Interactional Analysis  
As discussed in the literature review, interactional analysis is based on game theoretic 
concepts. This section will discuss the concepts behind interactional analysis and how a game is 
created. A thorough game will be discussed in chapter 5 under the Indiana Toll Road and 
Tanzania Railway project case studies. After identifying the high risks through ICRAM-PPP, a 
scenario analysis is conducted to create a scenario for a specific high risk in a PPP project. This 
scenario is then translated to a game.  
 These games are based on the premise that the players are rational and that they take 
sequential actions. Players take actions and receive a payoff based on the outcome of the game, 
which is based on their actions and the actions of other players. Taking an informal action 
reduces their payoff by a value of alpha (a uniform value within a range chosen by the user, can 
vary according to the party to the risk). Taking a formal action reduces the player’s payoff by beta 
(a uniform value within a range chosen by the user, can vary according to party and is higher than 
the value of alpha since formal actions cost more). Cost of formal action can be the cost of filing 
a claim or hiring a lawyer. The outcome of the game is the Nash equilibrium, which is the best 
outcome for all players under which no player would want to deviate. The Nash equilibrium is 
reached in these games through backward induction. Backward induction solves a game by 
starting from the end of the game. The last action is evaluated and a comparison of the payoff for 





exact values of the payoffs, they are given equations and an assumption is made for each term in 
the equation during the simulations.  
The game is simulated using Anylogic software for 1000 simulations. The results obtained 
from solving the model and from the simulation are analyzed to propose strategies to each actor. 
The next section discusses simulation of the interactional analysis scenarios. 
 
3.6 Simulation 
Simulations of the interactional analysis game are performed in order to study the effect of 
varying the values of the parameters and extracting patterns. These simulations are used to 
observe a wide spectrum of outcomes. One case is named the base case in order to compare it to 
the rest of the cases. In the rest of the cases, one parameter is changed (from the base case) while 
the rest are kept constant. This will help in comparing the effect of changing one parameter on the 
payoffs received for each actor. Details of the values/ranges chosen for each parameter are 
discussed in chapter 5 under the ITR case study.  
 
3.7 Summary  
This chapter provided a synopsis of the methodology used in this dissertation. It presented the 
flow of processes under this dissertation and the thought process behind it. It showed a brief 
outline of the methodology process that will be discussed in detail in the coming chapters. 
Chapter four presents the International Construction Risk Assessment Model for Public Private 





4. ICRAM-PPP(INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION RISK ASSESSMENT 
MODEL FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS) 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the International Construction Risk Assessment Model for Public Private 
Partnerships (ICRAM-PPP).  ICRAM-PPP is a risk assessment model tailored specifically for 
PPP projects based on the original ICRAM-1 (Hastak and Shaked 2000). It consists of risks 
divided into three levels: Macro, Market and Project. Under each level, there are sub-levels that 
group various risks. ICRAM-PPP is intended for use by parties looking to enter into a public-
private partnership agreement such as private companies, governments or financiers. In order to 
modify ICRAM-1, a systematic literature review process was conducted to collect all risks 
relating to PPP project. 
 
4.2 Systematic Literature Review for ICRAM-PPP  
This dissertation applies the framework of systematic literature review (SLR), as proposed by 
Kitchenham (2004), Brereton et al. (2007), and Kitchenham et al. (2010), on the topic of risks in 
PPP projects in the construction industry. SLR is appropriate for broad review of any phenomena 
(in this case renegotiations in PPP) within the literature of a discipline (in this case construction 
area) based on primary research (in this case published articles, reports and case studies) 
(Kitchenham 2004, Brereton et al. 2007, and Kitchenham et al. 2010). In this research, SLR is 





PPP projects. Figure 4.1 shows the research outline starting on the top left with the SLR which 
leads to the creation of the risk registry framework and ICRAM-PPP, followed by risk analysis 














Figure 4.1 Structure of the Research  
 
Systematic literature review consists of 3 stages: plan, perform, and report. Under each stage, 
there are a number of sub-stages. Figure 4.2 shows the stages performed for the systematic 















Systematic Literature Review Process 
 
The search for studies was conducted using 
a number of identified sources: 
x ASCE Library 
x Science Direct 
x Google Scholar 
x Purdue Online Library 
x List of literature related to PPP collected by Gross (2010) 
-Identify risks in the Macro, Market and Project levels in 
PPP projects
-Updated Table by Gross (2010)  
with ~400 articles relating to PPP projects 
-ASCE Library (JME and JCEM) 
-Science Direct 
-Google Scholar 
Result: 500+ articles about PPP projects
Keyword selection of the literature was: 
(i) PPP, P3, 3P and PFI. 
(ii) One of the following 4 terms: “Risk 
management/assessment/allocation/factors. 
Result: 44 articles pertaining to risks in PPP projects
Data was tabulated to show risks in each article or case study. 
Nvivo was used to verify results. 
Over 400 risks were found and narrowed down to 82 risks. 
List was finalized and merged to create ICRAM-PPP. 
Validated through the Delphi process
-How will the article search process proceed? 
-What are the sources for articles? Which Journals? 










Create the study 
protocol 
3rd Stage: Report 
2nd Stage: Perform 





A set of articles as the “primary studies” was defined based on the tabulated list of literature on 
PPP by Gross (2010) consisting of about 450 articles. This list is classified according to the 
following eight categories: (1) general concepts, (2) governance issues, (3) procurement, (4) 
contract design, (5) risk management, (6) financial elements, (7) public sector considerations and 
(8) national applications and case studies. At the first step this set was updated through the 
addition of 105 articles. An online search for articles was conducted using the ASCE library, 
Science direct, Google scholar and Purdue online library. The second step involved limiting the 
selection to articles that discuss risks in PPP projects. Within the selected set, all the case studies 
were chosen. Besides, two criteria had to be met in order for the article to be selected. The 
keyword for selection of the literature had to include the following:  
(i) One of the following 4 terms: “Private finance initiative, Public private 
partnerships (PPP), Private sector participation, 3P, P3” due to different terms 
used in different countries, and  
(ii) One of the following 4 terms: “Risk management/assessment/ allocation/factors”  
All articles chosen met both criteria with the exception of 2 articles that only had PPP as 
a keyword. The final set consisted of 44 articles that were used to identify suggested risk 
indicators. This is performed in view of the structure of ICRAM-1 (Hastak and Shaked 2000) as 
the framework for risk registry in international construction. The 73 risk indicators in ICRAM-1 
are categorized based on higher-level risk indicators. For example, societal conflicts (e.g., 
demonstrations, strikes, & street violence) and instability because of non-constitutional changes 
are under the symptoms of instability. The higher-level categories are considered to identify risks 
associated with PPP within the selected set of literature. Therefore, a Table was created using 
higher-level risk indicators suggested by ICRAM-1, to classify risk indicators suggested by the 
literature under these higher-level criteria. It includes the exact wording of the referenced article 





and validation process. The result was over 400 risk factors, which were then integrated with 
existing risk factors from ICRAM-1 and refined to reduce the repetition. In the process of cross 
analysis between existing and identified risks, few risk indicators from ICRAM-1 that were not 
traced in the literature were eliminated or integrated into the identified risk indicator. In this 
process, the literature was also coded into NVivo and used in triangulating the results and refining 
the Table. For example, coded literature into NVivo was used as a query for the most referred 
risks available in literature under each category (such as political risk). This query then was 
compared to extracted risks for potential elimination of risks from ICRAM-1 that were not related 
to renegotiation in PPP. The final outcome is a tabulated risk registry for risk indicators 
associated with renegotiation in PPP based on contrasting risks from ICRAM-1 as an established 
risk framework with the structured literature of PPP.  
 
4.3 Increasing Reliability of ICRAM-PPP 
In order to increase ICRAM’s reliability, the impact of some of the risks was calculated using 
well-established indicators. These indicators were collected from various sources and pertained to 
some of the macro and market level risks. These risks include: 
Monetary Inflation (under Macro Level): the indicator for this risk is inflation as calculated by 
the World Bank (2016). Table 4.1 below shows a sample of the inflation rates for some countries. 
Using trends analysis, criterion was established to match the trend in each country to a specific 
level of risk as shown in Table 4.2. A decreasing slope for inflation indicates low significance of 
the risk and a rating number of 25 whereas a sharply increasing slope shows that inflation has 








Table 4.1 Monetary Inflation for select countries from 2006-2014 (Source: IMF) 
Country name 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Armenia 2.9 4.4 8.9 3.4 8.2 7.7 2.6 5.8 3 
Aruba 3.6 5.4 9 -2.1 2.1 4.4 0.6 -2.4 0.4 
Australia 3.5 2.3 4.4 1.8 2.8 3.3 1.8 2.4 2.5 
Austria 1.4 2.2 3.2 0.5 1.8 3.3 2.5 2 1.6 
Azerbaijan 8.4 16.6 20.8 1.4 5.7 7.9 1 2.4 1.4 
Bahamas, The 2.4 2.5 4.5 2.1 1.3 3.2 2 0.3 1.5 
Bahrain 2 3.3 3.5 2.8 2 -0.4 2.8 3.2 2.8 
Bangladesh 6.8 9.1 8.9 5.4 8.1 10.7 6.2 7.5 7 
Barbados 7.3 4 8.1 3.6 5.8 9.4 4.5 1.8 1.9 
Belarus 7 8.4 14.8 12.9 7.7 53.2 59.2 18.3 18.1 
 
Table 4.2 Mapping out risk assessment and rating using trends analysis 
Assessment Rating Trend 
25 Low Decreasing slope 
50 Medium Horizontal slope 
75 High Increasing slope 
100 Extremely High Sharply increasing slope 
 
Economic Growth and volatility: the indicator for this risk is the GDP growth as calculated by 
the World Bank.  
Debt as GDP converted to US dollars: the indicator for this risk is debt as GDP as calculated by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Capacity to Service Debt: the indicator for this risk is total debt service. 
Capital Flow: the indicator for this risk is capital flows as calculated by the International 





Government Reliability/Creditworthiness/Cooperation: the indicator for this risk is credit 
rating of government. One of the agencies that provides these ratings is Standard and Poors and 
the rating ranges from AAA (prime) to D (in default).  
Extent of deficit/surplus: the indicator for this risk is given by cash surplus/deficit as calculated 
by the World Bank. The numbers are plotted on a graph and using trends analysis, a risk rating is 
given. A sharply decreasing slope would indicate sharp increases in deficit and thus a high risk 
rating. 
Current Account Balance: the indicator for this risk is calculated by the World Bank. Similar to 
the previous risk, a sharply decreasing slope would indicate sharp decreases in account balance 
and thus a high risk rating. 
Political Continuity/Stability of Government: the indicator for this risk is the political 
instability indicator which shows the threats posed by social unrests to the government.  
Current Market Volume in Core Competency: the indicator for this risk is calculated by the 
market potential index as calculated by Michigan State University (GlobalEdge, 2016) 
Foreign Exchange Reserves: this is calculated by the International Monetary Fund for all 
countries. A sharply decreasing slope would indicate sharp decreases in foreign exchange 






4.4 Risk Registry 
4.4.1 Risk Registry for the Macro/Country Level 
OPERATIONAL RISKS 
Host Government Indicators: 
1. Political continuity/Stability of Government: this includes policy volatility, unstable public 
partner (government) and inconsistency in government policies. 
2. Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit: an unfavorable climate towards 
foreign/private investors and repatriation of profit will affect the progress of a PPP project 
and may cause opposition 
3. Nationalization/expropriation/sequestration of assets: decision of a country to take over 
privately-owned assets in national interest 
4. Enforceability of contracts: the availability of legislative regulations ensure the 
enforceability of a contract, protect the parties, reduces risk and support the use of PPP as a 
delivery method 
5. Government Incentives: lack of an incentive for the private investor would affect the 
attractiveness of the project. 
6. Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for PPP 
projects: PPP projects in countries that are newly adopting the PPP delivery method or 
countries that do not have enforced laws will suffer until a standard is established for all 
projects to follow 
7. Changes in country/region legislation and regulation: UnsTable governance mechanisms 
may lead to inconsistency or changes to federal or state policies/laws/regulations. Industrial 
regulatory changes may also be observed which will affect the project phases. Legal and 






Economic and Financial Indicators: 
8. Monetary inflation: change in inflation as a measure of a country’s economic condition 
9. Economic growth and volatility: Economic growth can be measured using economic 
indicators such as GDP. Other factors include a poor or volatile financial market. 
Administration 
10. Bureaucratic delays: caused by a poor or lengthy decision-making process, which leads to 
delays in approval of project submittals, permits and licenses.  
11. Required services: such as a lack of IT infrastructure, communication, and Transportation 
POLITICAL RISKS 
External Indicators: 
1.prc Regional turbulences (war, etc.) 
2.prc Dependence on (or importance of) a major power network: such as dependence of an 
investor on the government’s promises so the withdrawal of the government’s support system 
would affect the project 
Internal Indicators: 
3.prc Fragmented political structure (e.g., local and federal governments): such as entering 
into contract with the local government instead of the federal government. Another example 
is volatility in decision-making and policy-making caused by a small number of veto players 
in the government 
4.prc Fractionalization by Language, Ethnic, and Regional Groups: various groups 
representing different religions or tribes may contribute to political instability 
5.prc Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty: a country 
where corruption and dishonesty are prevalent may suffer from political instability 
6.prc Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution): these conditions may 





7.prc Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body: occurs when the local government 
officials decide to satisfy their own short-term goals rather than the local government’s long-
term goals. This can happen when a government official is only focusing on the duration 
he/she will be in office or when he/she is nearing the end of their term 
Symptoms of Instability Indicators: 
8.prc Societal conflicts: such as protests, opposition, demonstration, strike, hostility, vandalism 
or industrial action. Another risk is the adverse portrayal of the project by the media. 
9.prc Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation:  this includes government 
interference (breach/cancellation of contract, failure to renew approvals, unfair taxes, import 
constraints, contractual violations), political reneging or discontent and lack of government 
cooperation with the private party.  
10.prc Instability because of non-constitutional changes: affected by political instability of a 
government 
FINANCIAL RISKS 
Legal Framework Indicators: 
1.frc Actual laws versus practice for repatriation of capital: can be caused by an immature 
juristic structure. 
Foreign Exchange Generation Indicators: 
2.frc Current account balance: measure of a country’s economic condition  
3.frc Capital flow: measure of a country’s ability to produce foreign exchange  
International Reserves Indicators: 
4.frc Foreign exchange reserves: foreign currencies held as reserves to back liabilities  
5.frc Gold and other reserves: measures the economic condition of a country since gold is a 
measure of international reserves 





6.frc Debt as GDP converted to US dollars: can be heightened by an increase in the national 
debt. 
7.frc Capacity to service debt: a low capacity to service debt already present in the country 
would reduce the stability of the government. This can be measured by “a ratio of annual 
public foreign loan obligations and foreign exchange earned”  
Budget Performance Indicators: 
8.frc Extent of deficit/surplus:  this affects the interest rate, inflation rate and other financial 
measures in the market 
9.frc Restrictions to refinancing schemes: these restrictions can deter a project that has been 
suffering financially and can’t find any new financing opportunities 
10.frc Sources of revenue and major spending: the dependence of a country on one main 
source of revenue, such as petroleum, would leave it susceptible to volatility in its price thus 
affecting the financial stability of the country 
4.4.2 Risk Registry for the Market Level 
TECHNOLOGY 
1.m Investor’s technological advantage: can be affected by competitor’s innovation in 
technologies or their application of similar technologies which would reduce the current 
company’s technological advantage 
2.m Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment: some projects might need 
special equipment or novel techniques that may not be readily available. 
CONTRACTS AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
3.m Type of partnership: the structure of the partnership, involvement or responsibility or parties 





4.m Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract: lack of enforceability of 
contracts will affect the project and may lead to a higher rate of contract renegotiations 
5.m Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many agencies, delay in 
granting approvals): the presence of a large number of agencies that are required for 
approval would delay the process and could lead to a failure in obtaining statutory approvals. 
RESOURCES 
6.m Availability and quality of local contractors: lack of high quality local contractors can delay 
project start and increase costs incurred from getting contractors from outside the local area 
7.m Availability of construction material: lack of construction material may deter a project or 
increase costs if materials had to be brought in from outside the country 
8.m Availability of skilled and unskilled workers: working in a foreign country may create a 
problem if there is a shortage of skilled workers 
9.m Labor cost/productivity: may delay the project or lead to an upsurge in cost  
10.m Availability of equipment and parts: this is important to the construction and operation 
phases of a project to avoid delays due to unavailable equipment 
FINANCING 
11.m Availability of financing: can be influenced by high finance costs, limited capital or 
limited availability of loans for long-term projects. 
12.m Tax and non-tax incentives in construction industry: can be influenced by 
macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rate, currency or purchasing power. 
13.m Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate: interest rate volatility and macroeconomic 
fluctuations in currency/purchasing power 
14.m Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability: can be affected by a financial crisis 






BUSINESS CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
15.m Interaction of foreign management with local contractors: cultural differences may cause 
problems between parties 
16.m A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship: can be disrupted due to lack of coordination or 
trust between parties 
17.m Risk management practices of parties involved: may be affected by differences between 
parties (country of origin, cultural differences) 
MARKET POTENTIAL 
18.m Current market volume in core competency: current market volume would affect the 
project’s attractiveness and substantiate the need of the project  
19.m Future market industry volume in core competency: changes in the market need to be 
examined before starting a project 
20.m Bidding volume index resulting in competition: lack of qualified bidders would reduce 
bidding competition whereas a high number of bidders would increase competition 
21.m Stability of associated industries: instability of related industries can adversely affect the 
project phases 
4.4.3 Risk Registry for the Project Level 
TECHNOLOGY 
1.p Problem with technology transfer and implementation: unproven technologies, unforeseen 
failure of technologies or technology obsolescence can cause problems. 
2.p Retention of technological advantage: problems due to technology transfers. 
CONTRACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES 
3.p Possibility of contractual disputes and negotiations: negotiations that occur throughout the 





4.p Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws: can be affected by a country’s 
dispute resolution method and its effectiveness 
5.p Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation: disagreements on risk 
allocation, staffing of people or distribution of authority. 
6.p Problems in contract conditions: accuracy, complexity or flexibility of contracts can cause 
problems between parties. Excessive contract variations also cause problems.  
7.p Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) including management, 
construction, operation, and financing capability:  such as inadequate experience in PPP 
projects or lack of management competence of parties. 
RESOURCES 
8.p Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers: incompetence or unavailability of available 
workers 
9.p Insolvency/default of subcontractor or operator or suppliers: this can occur due to 
subcontractor/operator’s inherent financial problems or financial problems in the country 
itself which can lead to halting of projects or delays and search for new 
subcontractors/operators 
10.p Delay/unavailability/unreliability of material supply: can be caused by supply risk, 
failure of materials in inspection or low quality of resource supply. 
DESIGN 
11.p Delay in design and regulatory approvals: bureaucratic delays can affect the approval 
process thus delaying dependent tasks 
12.p Complex/defective design, error, and rework: such as inappropriate or inefficient design, 
forecasting errors due to changes in traffic (for transportation projects), changing output 





13.p Change orders/variations: such as excessive or late changes in design or scope  
14.p Difficulties to meet construction programs: this can occur due to bad design or materials 
15.p Unforeseen adverse ground conditions: this is a common risk in construction projects 
and can lead to delays resulting from the need to change design to accommodate the 
unexpected conditions 
QUALITY 
16.p Bad quality of materials: which can be linked to reliability of source. 
17.p Bad quality of workmanship: this can cause rejection of work by the owner and the need 
for rework which would increase the costs and delay the project 
18.p Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance: problems manifest due to 
the long-term maintenance of assets, occurrence of latent defects or shortfalls in asset service 
quality. 
FINANCIAL 
19.p Financial difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions: such as cash flow 
problems and financial capability of government, consortium or financier. 
20.p Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rates: this can occur especially in 
PPP projects since the project can depend on money from financial organizations outside the 
country hence currency exchange rates would affect its financial status. 
21.p Drop in project revenue: inaccurate prediction of project demand leads to a drop in 
revenue. 
22.p Risk of non-payment or delayed-payment by the public partner/delay in annuity: an 
inconsistent or unreliable public partner can affect the private partner’s financial status by 





23.p Tariff problems: especially for transportation projects where there is a risk of changes in 
tariff increase, decrease or even tariff freeze). 
CONSTRUCTION AND CULTURAL ISSUES 
24.p High costs of project operations: costs can be due to land acquisition, utility relocation 
or transaction costs in claims. 
25.p Third party delays: such as utility risks or unexpected risks due to the presence of 
multiple contractors. 
26.p Safety/security/failure problems at project site: poor safety measures will increase the 
occurrence of accidents on-site and may delay projects.  
27.p Managerial issues:  this includes lack of incentives in the project where cost of 
compliance is higher than penalization, site preparation risks, failures or prolonged downtime 
and land and right of way acquisition 
28.p Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties:  such as differences 
between parties’ risk attitude, working methods and commitment. 
29.p Weather conditions, geographic/demographic changes, natural causes of delay (force 
majeure) and unforeseen risks 
30.p Physical damage to project by riots, terrorist act, theft and so forth 
 
 
4.5  Delphi Process 
The Delphi technique was applied in this research in order to validate the risk registry 
and ensure that all possible risks pertaining to PPP projects were included. Decision-makers who 
are top management, industry experts, financial advisors and academic professors were targeted 
as participants. Since risks in PPP projects were previously identified for inclusion in ICRAM-






participants the risk registry previously identified in ICRAM-PPP. Definitions of each risk were 
also sent to the participants to ensure common understanding of the risks. 
Average results along with reasons behind them were sent to the participants in the 
second phase. Sending the reasons is known to help in accurately answering the survey the 
second time (Best 1974). According to Hallowell (2009), reporting of median values is preferred 
over mean values in order to minimize biases.  
This study requires people who have had exposure to various areas in a PPP project such as 
social, economic, political and technical aspects. An advantage of the Delphi method is that it 
does not require geographic proximity of the participants since the expertise required could be 
found in people who are geographically diverse (Okoli and Pawlowski 2015). Panel selection was 
based on the following criteria (Ke et al. 2010, Chan et al. 2014): 
x Experience in academia either in teaching or researching about PPP projects and or 
x Experience in industry through working in PPP projects 
x Experience in PPP project  
In this research, we follow the systematic procedure suggested Okoli and Pawlowski (2015) 
“knowledge resource nomination worksheet”. The first three steps, which are applicable to our 
research, are as follows: 
1. Identify the sectors for the panels such as academia and researchers 
2. Write names for the people to contact in each sector 
3. Contact the nominees and ask them to nominate others 
One of the challenges facing the Delphi method is the low response rate as reported by Chan 
et al. (2014) who had an 18% response rate. In this research, the response rate was slightly higher, 





they did not have enough experience in PPP projects to participate and that they either had not 
been  
 
in the industry enough, were not directly involved or had not seen situations of risk. For the 
second stage, 50% of the participants were involved. 
 
 Figure 4.3 Participants’ roles in PPP projects 
 
 
 The total number of participants in the study is 24 experts. This shows a response rate of 
about 20%.  Figure 4.3 shows a graph of the number of participants who are working (or 
previously worked) in each role in a PPP project. Some participants worked in more than one role 
for different projects as can be seen. The classification “others” includes consultant, lender and 
investor. Representing various backgrounds and positions was important in order to capture the 
experience of different sectors of people. Figure 4.4 shows a graph of the number of participants 
involved in each range of years for active participation (direct work in PPP projects) and passive 
participation (research on PPP projects). Figure 4.5 shows the percentage of participant 
involvement in the different PPP phases. 

















Figure 4.5 Participant involvement in PPP project phases 
 
 
Gunhan and Arditi (2005) stated that most of the changes occur in the first 2 rounds and 
after that, change was little. Since we started with results from a structured literature review, our 
aim was to create consensus among participants for existing data so the number of rounds 


















































































In the first round, we sent invitations to 122 people to participate in the Delphi process. 
24 responses with consent were received so they were emailed the survey. In the second round, 
some modifications were made to the definitions to reduce confusion. It was noticed that industry 
experts were more prone to confusion about the Delphi study than were the academics.  
The results of the Delphi study were twofold. The first result was validating the PPP risk 
registry where the participants were asked to indicate if a risk does not occur in PPP projects. Out 
of the 82 risks, two were found to be not applicable to PPP projects: “4.Fractionalization by 
language, ethnic background, etc.” and “5.Gold and other reserves”. These two were removed 
from the risk registry. The second result was mapping out the risks according to what project 
phase(s) they occur in or affect. Tables 4.4 through 4.6 present the results of the Delphi study for 







Table 4.4 Delphi Results for the Macro Level Risks 

Macro Level Risks 
Risk occurs in highlighted 
phases (Yellow) 


































































1.orc=Political continuity/Stability of Government                             
2.orc=Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit                             
3.orc=Nationalization/Expropriation/sequestration of assets                             
4.orc=Enforceability of contracts                             
5.orc=Government Incentives                             
6.orc=Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for 
PPP projects                             
7.orc=Changes in country/region legislation and regulation                             
8.orc=Monetary inflation                             
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility                             
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays                             
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, Transportation)                             
1.prc=Regional turbulences (war, etc.)                             
2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network                             
3.prc=Fragmented political structure (e.g. local and federal governments)                             
5.prc=Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty                             
6.prc=Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution)                             
7.prc=Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body                             
8.prc=Societal conflicts (demonstrations, strikes)                             
9.prc=Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation                           







1.frc=Actual laws versus practice for repatriation of capital                             
2.frc=Current account balance                             
3.frc=Capital flow                             
4.frc=Foreign exchange reserves                             
6.frc=Debt as GDP converted to US dollars                             
7.frc=Capacity to service debt                             
8.frc=Extent of deficit/surplus                             
9.frc=Restrictions to refinancing schemes                             















Table 4.5 Delphi Results for the Market Level Risks 
Ȑ
Market Level Risks 
Risk occurs in highlighted 
phases (Yellow) 


































































1m=Investor’s technological advantage                             
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment                             
3m=Type of partnership                             
4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract                             
5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many agencies, 
delay in granting approvals)                             
6m=Availability and quality of local contractors                             
7m=Availability of construction material                             
8m=Availability of skilled and unskilled workers                             
9m=Labor cost/productivity                             
10m=Availability of equipment and parts                             
11m=Availability of financing                             
12m=Tax and non tax incentives in construction industry                             
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate                             
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability                             
11m=Availability of financing                             
12m=Tax and non tax incentives in construction industry                             
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate                             
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability                             
15m=Interaction of foreign management with local contractors                             







17m=Risk management practices of parties involved                             
18m=Current market volume in core competency                             
19m=Future market industry volume in core competency                             
20m=Bidding volume index resulting in competition                             
21m=Stability of associated industries                             
 
Table 4.6 Delphi Results for the Project Level Risks 
Project Level Risks 
Risk occurs in highlighted 
phases (Yellow) 


































































1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation                             
2p=Retention of technological advantage                             
3p=Possibility of contractual disputes                             
4p=Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws                             
5p=Changes in construction regulations                             
6p-Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation                             
7p-Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)                             
8p=Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers                             
9p=Availability of special equipment                             
10p=Delays with the material supply                             
11p=Delay with design and regulatory approvals                             
12p=Complex/Defective design, error, and rework                             
13p=Change orders/variations                             







15p=Unforeseen adverse ground conditions                             
16p=Bad quality of materials                             
17p=Bad quality of workmanship                             
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance                             
19p=Financial difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions                             
20p=Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate                             
21p=Drop in project revenue                             
22p=Risk of non-payment or delayed-payment by the public partner/Delay in annuity                             
23p=Tariff problems                             
24p=High costs of project operations                             
25p=Third party delays                             
26p=Safety/Security/Failure problems at project site                             
27p=Managerial Issues                             
28p=Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties                             
29p=Weather conditions, geographic/demographic changes, natural causes of delay 
(force majeure) and unforeseen risks                             







This chapter discussed the development of the risk registry and modification of ICRAM-PPP in 
detail. Appendix B shows an example of the calculations made in ICRAM-PPP for the AHP and 
pairwise comparison. It discussed the Delphi method that was conducted, steps taken and results 
obtained. The following chapter presents the Indiana Toll Road (ITR) and Tanzania Railway 
project case studies. It starts by discussing the background of each project then applying ICRAM-





5 INDIANA TOLL ROAD CASE STUDY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the Indiana Toll Road (ITR) project as the case study in this dissertation. 
It applies the suggested framework to identify high risks in the ITR project in order to create a 
scenario using interactional analysis between three parties to show possible outcomes and best 
strategies. This is performed through two steps: the first is applying ICRAM-PPP to the project to 
get the high risks and the second is applying the Interactional Analysis framework to the risk 
scenario chosen. 
5.2 Background 
This section describes the historic background of the project, parties involved and then introduces 
the problems they faced. Data collection for this case study included analysis of project 
documentation, newspaper articles and semi-structured interviews with high-level management 
involved in the project. 
The Indiana Toll Road spans about 157 miles between the Ohio Turnpike and Chicago 
Skyway. It was open to traffic in 1956 (Levy 2011). In 2005, Governor Mitch Daniels took office 
and led the Indiana Department of Transportation to conduct a study on the state of highways in 
Indiana. The study showed a shortage of $1.8 billion, which led to the creation of the “Major 
Moves” program aimed at funding transportation projects in the state (Levy 2011). In order to 
fund this program and to offset losses in toll collection from the Indiana Toll Road, a decision to 






In 2006, Cintra (a subsidy of the Spanish company Ferrovial) and Macquarie Group 
(Australian Investment bank) won a 75-year lease to operate the Indiana Toll Road for a 50-50 
share through a bid of $3.8 billion with ITRCC being 85% debt-financed. The same 
concessionaire had also previously won rights for the Chicago Skyway project a few years earlier. 
Work under the lease included: 
x Implementing electronic tolling equipment, and 
x Expanding the number of lanes to 3 in some areas 
ITRCC would make revenue from the tolls collected along the roadway. In an effort to 
secure/enhance their financial status, ITRCC agreed on interest rate swaps with their lenders. An 
interest swap is a financial measure taken by two parties to swap their interest rate based on a 
specified amount. One party usually has a fixed rate while the other has a floating rate (NYU 
Stern School of Business 1999). For example, if party A has a floating or variable rate and wants 
to be financially safer, they can enter into contract with party B that has a fixed interest rate for its 
bond to swap interest rates for a certain period of time. This way party A would pay the fixed 
interest and party B would pay the floating interest for that duration (so they both swap interests 
and pay the other’s interest rate). When party A chooses the fixed interest rate over the floating 
rate, it would benefit only if the floating rate during that period exceeds its fixed rate. So their 
new interest rate (fixed) is lower than the original interest rate (floating) hence they would be 
gaining. However, if the floating interest rate for a month is lower than the fixed rate, they would 
be at a loss. In the case of ITRCC the interest sap did not work as anticipated and their new fixed 
rated was higher than the floating rate which meant that ITRCC would owe the difference (to the 
other party to the swap). This interest swap by the ITRCC led to an increase in its debt by $2.15 
billion (The Times of Northwest Indiana, 2014). This increase in debt coupled with the decline in 








ITRCC spent 18 months negotiating a restructuring plan with lenders and finally had to 
file Chapter 11 plan and declare bankruptcy in September 2014. In the case that a sale could not 
be made, ITRCC’s debt would have been reduced and the creditors would receive 95.75% of 
ITRCC’s equity (Macquarie Atlas Roads Annual Report 2014). In October 2014, the court 
approved ITRCC’s declaration of bankruptcy. The new bidding process resulted in 2 highest 
bidders: IFM investors (an Australian global fund manager) as the highest bidder and Lake and 
Laporte County coming in second (The Times of Northwest Indiana, 2015). IFM was chosen with 
a $5.8 billion buyout for ITRCC’s assets. IFM investors have been operating the ITR since then 
under the same name of ITRCC since they bought out its assets. 
 
5.3 ICRAM-PPP for ITR 
ICRAM-PPP was applied to the Indiana Toll Road project to identify the spectrum of risks in 
the project. Extensive literature review about the project was conducted and high-ranking experts 
involved in the ITR were identified and contacted. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 












Semi-structured interviews were conducted with four individuals, two from the 
concessionaire’s side and two from Indiana Finance Authority to collect their expert opinions on 
the weights and impacts for the risk factors in ICRAM-PPP.  
Their input was used to apply ICRAM-PPP to the Indiana Toll Road project specifically and 
capture the correct information about risks affecting this project. The modifications that were 
made were in the following areas of ICRAM-PPP: 
x Comparison between the levels of risk categories under each of the three levels: macro, 
market and project. The project level contains eight levels underneath it (technology, 
contracts and legal requirements, resources, design, quality, financial, construction and 
cultural differences, and others); the market level consists of six levels (technology, 
contracts and legal requirements, resources, financing, business cultural differences and 
market potential); while the macro level contains three levels (operational, political and 
financial) with each level further consisting of sub-levels underneath it. The scale used 
included five choices, which were: much more importance, more importance, same 
importance, less importance and much less importance as shown in Table 5.1. The 
experts were asked to choose from the list of five choices for comparing the levels under 
macro, market and project. 
Table 5.1 Scale used for the pairwise comparison 
Level of Impact Numerical 
Much more importance 1.5 
More importance 1.25 
Same importance 1 
Less importance 1/1.25 
Much less importance 1/1.5 
 
x Comparison of the sublevels under the macro level. Each of the three levels (operational, 
political and financial) contains sublevels under it. For example, the political level 





instability. The choices for comparison were: much more importance, more importance, 
same importance, less importance and much less importance as shown in Table 5.1. The 
experts were asked to choose from this list for comparing the sublevels under the macro 
level. 
x Comparison between the risks under each level. Each level/sublevel contains a list of 
risks that fall under it. For example, under the “external causes” under the macro level, 
there are two risks: regional turbulences and dependence on or importance of major 
power networks. These two risks are compared to each other using the same scale 
previously mentioned: much more importance, more importance, same importance, less 
importance and much less importance. 
x Level of impact of each risk which is a metric that considers the probability of occurrence 
of a risk along with its priority in the project. The options were [0, 25, 50, 75, 100], 
where 0 means absolutely no impact and 100 means very high impact. 
The results of ICRAM-PPP for the ITR project are shown in Table 5.2 to 5.4 for the 









Table 5.2 Concessionaire Macro Level Risks 
Criteria Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators) Weight Risk Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Operational  1.orc=Political continuity/Stability of Government 0.019050036 50 0.952501799 
Risk 2.orc=Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit 0.015778302 25 0.394457554 
3.orc=Nationalization/Expropriation/sequestration of assets 0.019096884 25 0.477422103 
4.orc=Enforceability of contracts 0.017498298 25 0.43745744 
5.orc=Government Incentives 0.014021202 0 0 
 
6.orc=Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for PPP 
projects 0.019563892 25 0.489097306 
7.orc=Changes in country/region legislation and regulation 0.019888496 75 1.491637176 
8.orc=Monetary inflation 0.059764879 25 1.494121972 
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility 0.074706099 50 3.735304929 
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays 0.064343509 25 1.608587732 
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, Transportation, etc.) 0.080429387 25 2.010734665 
Political  1.prc=Regional turbulences (war, etc.) 0.047115757 0 0 
Risk 2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network 0.070673635 0 0 
3.prc=Fragmented political structure (e.g. local and federal governments) 0.025344621 0 0 
5.prc=Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty 0.025344621 0 0 
6.prc=Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution) 0.026837792 0 0 
7.prc=Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body 0.024008625 0 0 
8.prc=Societal conflicts 0.031246152 0 0 
9.prc=Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation 0.054680765 25 1.36701913 
10.prc=Instability because of nonconstitutional changes 0.023434614 0 0 
Financial  1.frc=Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital 0.066942995 0 0 
Risk 2.frc=Current account balance 0.022314332 75 1.673574881 
3.frc=Capital flow 0.022314332 75 1.673574881 
4.frc=foreign exchange reserves 0.046352357 75 3.476426748 
6.frc=Debt as GDP converted to US dollars 0.022314332 50 1.115716588 
7.frc=Capacity to service debt 0.022314332 100 2.231433175 
8.frc=Extent of deficit/surplus 0.027694181 25 0.692354536 
9.frc=Restrictions to refinancing schemes  0.018462788 100 1.846278762 
10.frc=Sources of revenue and major spending 0.018462788 75 1.384709072 








Table 5.3 Concessionaire Market Level Risks 




Risk Assessment Weighted Assessment 
Technology 1m=Investor’s technological advantage 0.069378825 25 1.734470634 
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment 0.104068238 1 28.55241045 2.971399047 
Contracts &  3m=Type of partnership 0.076084027 25 1.902100685 
Legal  4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract 0.065586395 1 28.55241045 1.872649683 
Req. 5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many agencies, delay in granting approvals) 0.056534866  0 0 
Resources 6m=Availability and quality of local… 0.03566632 25 0.891657996 
7m=Availability of construction material 0.028533056 0 0 
8m=Availability of skilled and unskilled labor 0.028533056 25 0.713326397 
9m=Labor cost/productivity 0.028533056 25 0.713326397 
10m=Availability of equipment and parts 0.028533056 0 0 
Financing 11m=Availability of financing  0.050427879 1 28.55241045 1.439837511 
12m=Tax and non tax incentives 0.038111594 0 0 
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate 0.038111594 0 0 
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability 0.045113543 25 1.127838568 
Business   15m=Interaction of foreign management… 0.051130749 0 0 
Cultural 16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship 0.051130749 0 0 
Differences 17m=Risk management practices of parties involved 0.051130749 0 0 
Market 
Potential 18m=Current market volume in core competency 0.038348062  0 0 
19m=Future market industry volume 0.038348062 0 0 
20m=Bidding volume index resulting in competition 0.038348062 0 0 
  21m=Stability of associated industries 0.038348062 0 0 











Table 5.4 Concessionaire Project Level Risks 





Technology 1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation 0.049623608 2 10.69328553 0.530639406 
2p=Retention of technological advantage 0.049623608 2 10.69328553 0.530639406 
Contracts  3p=Possibility of contractual disputes 0.026599758 1 28.55241045 0.759487218 
and  4p=Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws 0.025453869 1 28.55241045 0.726769314 
Legal Issues 5p=Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation 0.028911585 1 28.55241045 0.825495454 
6p=Problems in contract conditions 0.028005944 50 1.400297208 
 
7p=Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
including management, construction, operation, and financing capability 0.024559861  25 0.613996536 
Resources 8p=Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers 0.032073978 25 0.801849457 
9p=Insolvency / default of subcontractor or operator or suppliers 0.04525431 1 28.55241045 1.292119628 
10p=Delay/unavailability/unreliability of material supply 0.034081359 25 0.852033983 
Design 11p=Delay with design and regulatory approvals 0.024089569 0 0 
12p=Complex/Defective design, error, and rework 0.022990913 0 0 
13p=Change orders/variations 0.028738641 25 0.718466036 
14p=Difficulties to meet construction programs 0.027535352 1 28.55241045 0.786200673 
15p=Unforeseen adverse ground conditions 0.022990913 0 0 
Quality 16p=Bad quality of materials 0.04452961 0 0 
17p=Bad quality of workmanship 0.04452961 0 0 
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance 0.055662013 25 1.391550324 
Financing 19p=Financial difficulties because of tax/capital movement restrictions 0.032679776 0 0 
20p=Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate 0.029886979 0 0 
21p=Drop in project revenue 0.034169268 2 13.36660692 0.456727176 
22p=Non-payment/delayed payment by the public (Delay in annuity) 0.029830313 25 0.745757836 
23p=Tariff problems 0.029830313 0 0 
Construction  24p=High costs of project operations 0.024573873 1 28.55241045 0.701643301 
And 25p=Third party delays 0.02323447 25 0.580861754 
 Cultural  26p=Safety/Security/Failure problems at project site 0.028894029 2 10.69328553 0.308972107 
Issues 27p=Managerial Issues 0.019431878 25 0.48579696 
28p=Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties 0.021256189 25 0.531404732 
Other 29p=Weather or other natural disaster 0.049314847 0 0 
  30p=Physical damage to the project 0.061643559 0 0 










Table 5.5 Indiana Finance Authority Macro Level Risks 
Criteria Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators) Weight Risk Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Operational  1.orc=Political continuity/Stability of Government 0.013676757 50 0.683837838 
Risk 2.orc=Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit 0.014580849 62.5 0.926840548 
3.orc=Nationalization/Expropriation/sequestration of assets 0.015181638 25 0.379540952 
4.orc=Enforceability of contracts 0.015445115 100 1.544511526 
5.orc=Government Incentives 0.013004815 50 0.650240726 
 
6.orc=Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for PPP 
projects 0.015480223 62.5 0.977955625 
7.orc=Changes in country/region legislation and regulation 0.014767796 75 1.082709877 
8.orc=Monetary inflation 0.062280372 25 1.557009301 
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility 0.06991163 50 3.495581484 
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays 0.054835496 87.5 4.873048949 
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, Transportation, etc.) 0.054857407 75 4.11430556 
Political  1.prc=Regional turbulances (war, etc.) 0.066653593 87.5 5.954319864 
Risk 2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network 0.053322874 62.5 3.430384038 
3.prc=Fragmented political structure (e.g. local and federal governments) 0.025460826 87.5 2.285210659 
5.prc=Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty 0.029797977 25 0.744949427 
6.prc=Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution) 0.026690467 75 2.085820849 
7.prc=Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body 0.02604149 62.5 1.577462977 
8.prc=Societal conflicts 0.032151035 50 1.607551725 
9.prc=Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation 0.051210142 25 1.280253542 
10.prc=Instability because of nonconstitutional changes 0.023461125 75 1.824147397 
Financial  1.frc=Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital 0.068109939 50 3.405496966 
Risk 2.frc=Current account balance 0.032751494 75 2.45636207 
3.frc=Capital flow 0.028794231 75 2.15956731 
4.frc=foreign exchange reserves 0.058394465 75 4.379584842 
6.frc=Debt as GDP converted to US dollars 0.027393671 50 1.369683528 
7.frc=Capacity to service debt 0.031000794 75 2.198298544 
8.frc=Extent of deficit/surplus 0.025922471 25 0.648061769 








10.frc=Sources of revenue and major spending 0.023906717 62.5 1.522895889 




Table 5.6 Indiana Finance Authority Market Level Risks 








Technology 1m=Investor’s technological advantage 0.087877051 87.5 7.629634682 
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment 0.078612488 62.5 4.969480208 
Contracts &  3m=Type of partnership 0.051180002 25 1.27950005 
Legal  4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract 0.066336758 76.92441686 5.102317047 
Req. 5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many agencies, delay in granting approvals)  0.061758586  75 4.745698883 
Resources 6m=Availability and quality of local… 0.030076376 75 2.30450494 
7m=Availability of construction material 0.029476643 62.5 1.840095566 
8m=Availability of skilled and unskilled labor 0.031355897 87.5 2.751243529 
9m=Labor cost/productivity 0.032877761 76.92441686 2.578255153 
10m=Availability of equipment and parts 0.033560366 75 2.477120812 
Financing 11m=Availability of financing  0.045072529 87.5 3.938959787 
12m=Tax and non tax incentives 0.043807807 1 51.96725853 2.274927484 
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate 0.045124009 1 58.22796895 2.637069714 
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability 0.041498558 1 50.04284167 2.07674122 
Business   15m=Interaction of foreign management… 0.050416637 75 3.849409566 
Cultural 16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship 0.046940188 75 3.409871579 
Differences 17m=Risk management practices of parties involved 0.054233735 75 4.040264473 
Market 
Potential 18m=Current market volume in core competency 0.04487629  50 2.243814506 
19m=Future market industry volume 0.042321197 50 2.116059862 
20m=Bidding volume index resulting in competition 0.04244507 75 3.124087064 
  21m=Stability of associated industries 0.041139979 62.5 2.587678501 











Table 5.7 Indiana Finance Authority Project Level Risks 








Technology 1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation 0.062100032 2 59.85681247 3.735397469 
2p=Retention of technological advantage 0.069414538 2 57.4796886 3.962022871 
Contracts  3p=Possibility of contractual disputes 0.031786896 39.42441686 1.349408302 
and  4p=Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws 0.027197032 1 51.96725853 1.419177146 
Legal Issues 5p=Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation 0.022931165 39.42441686 0.939414226 
6p=Problems in contract conditions 0.025964471 62.5 1.600660057 
7p=Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)  0.025915356 2 59.85681247 1.56004704 
Resources 8p=Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers 0.036912444 2 59.40410546 2.162502897 
9p=Insolvency / default of subcontractor or operator or suppliers 0.037923037 75 2.879513079 
10p=Delay/unavailability/unreliability of material supply 0.04030226 2 59.85681247 2.36728519 
Design 11p=Delay with design and regulatory approvals 0.02327718 76.92441686 1.75868131 
12p=Complex/Defective design, error, and rework 0.027649774 87.5 2.422873101 
13p=Change orders/variations 0.024960093 62.5 1.59010891 
14p=Difficulties to meet construction programs 0.024071153 62.5 1.545661882 
15p=Unforeseen adverse ground conditions 0.025204023 87.5 2.232405953 
Quality 16p=Bad quality of materials 0.044476595 2 59.85681247 2.668352732 
17p=Bad quality of workmanship 0.041757677 2 57.4796886 2.429534136 
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance 0.034810916 62.5 2.110779329 
Financing 19p=Financial difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions 0.0280411 1 51.96725853 1.456246012 
20p=Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate 0.024106454 1 51.96725853 1.255116793 
21p=Drop in project revenue 0.025756357 2 67.97673462 1.787881297 
22p=Risk of non-payment/delayed-payment by public partner/Delay in annuity 0.025399047 87.5 2.261906864 
23p=Tariff problems 0.022900531 1 58.22796895 1.333215278 
Construction  24p=High costs of project operations 0.02332529 75 1.749396746 
And 25p=Third party delays 0.023638478 62.5 1.484760203 
 Cultural  26p=Safety/Security/Failure problems at project site 0.028040122 75 2.227760816 
Issues 27p=Managerial Issues 0.024555154 62.5 1.589585625 
28p=Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties 0.022834663 52.37712387 1.1874813 







  30p=Physical damage to the project 0.058640202 50 2.932010118 





























             
           Figure 5.1 Relative weights for the three levels as calculated for the Concessionaire and IFA 
 



















































































































               
                 




































































Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show pie charts of the weights assigned to each of the three levels 
(macro, market and project) as well as the three sublevels under the macro level (operational, 
political, and financial). The results for the concessionaire are shown on the left and those for IFA 
on the right. Comparing the percentages for each level/sublevel, it can be seen that the weights 
given by both parties are very similar most of the time. In certain instances, there is a difference 
of 3-5% like under the Macro level where the concessionaire gave a weight of 33% for political 
risks while IFA gave it 28%. However, underneath the political risks, the concessionaire and IFA 
gave a near identical weighting for the three sublevels: internal causes [31% and 32%], external 
causes [36% and 36%] and symptoms of instability [33% and 32%] respectively. Appendix B 
shows the calculation details for ICRAM-PPP including how weights were assigned. 
 The total weighted assessment for the macro, market and project level were as follows: 
x Concessionaire: 28.55 (macro), 13.37 (market), 15.04 (project) 
x Indiana Finance Authority: 61.08 (macro), 67.98 (market), 61.3 (project 
 
For the concessionaire, their outlook on risks can be extracted to mean that they view macro 
risks as the highest and market as the lowest. For the IFA, they viewed market risks as the highest 
and macro and project risks in a tie. A big gap can be noticed between both party’s answers. After 
discussions with both parties, the main difference observed was that the concessionaire gave low 
impact values to risks that were concessionaire-related because they could mitigate them whereas 
the IFA looked at all risks from outside perspective, since they can not control them, they gave 
them higher values. Another important issue to note is that the Indiana Toll Road is a pre-existing 
project that was already constructed and operating. The concessionaire signed was for some 
additions to the pre-existing roadway, renovations and maintenance of the assets. This means that 






Table 5.8 shows the high risks obtained from ICRAM-PPP for the concessionaire and 
IFA. A maximum threshold was used to determine which risks were considered high and which 
were not. A threshold of 5% of the sum of weighted assessments per level was used for each of 
the levels for IFA’s answers, while a threshold of 7.5% of the sum of weighted assessments per 
level was used for the concessionaire’s side. This was because the concessionaire had a lower 
total sum so the threshold had to be increased so as to only include the highest risks.  
 
Table 5.8 High Risks from ICRAM-PPP 





9.orc=Economic growth and volatility ط ط 
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays ط 
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, 
Transportation, etc.) ط  
1.prc=Regional turbulences (war, etc.) ط   
2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network ط   
1.frc=Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital ط   
4.frc=Foreign exchange reserves ط ط 
7.frc=Capacity to service debt   ط 
Market Risk Indicators 
1m=Investor’s technological advantage ط ط 
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and 
equipment ط ط 
3m=Type of partnership   ط 
4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession 
contract ط ط 
5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g. delays, 
presence of many agencies) ط   
11m=Availability of financing    ط 
15m=Interaction of foreign management with local 
contractors ط   
16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship ط   
17m=Risk management practices of parties involved ط   
Project Risk Indicators 
1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation ط   





6p=Problems in contract conditions   ط 
9p=Insolvency / default of subcontractor or operator or 
suppliers ط ط 
16p=Bad quality of materials ط   
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for 
maintenance   ط 
29p=Weather or other natural disasters ط   
30p=Physical damage to the project ط   
 
From this list of high risks for the concessionaire and IFA, risks that were high according to 
both parties were highlighted. Some of these risks involved only two parties while others 
involved three parties. Since the focus of this dissertation is introducing and proposing three-party 
analysis, a risk that involved three parties was chosen. This risk is “9p=Insolvency/default of 
subcontractor or operator or suppliers.” This risk involves the following three parties: 
subcontractor, contractor and IFA. Some reasons behind subcontractor insolvency/default include 
the following: 
• Failure to perform 
• Ineffective business practices 
• Financial insolvency (economic downturns) 
• Not receiving payments   
In this case study, the example chosen was the last point, subcontractor not receiving 
payments. As discussed in the methodology, the approach used to create scenarios for the 
interactional analysis is through scenario planning. The following scenario planning applies to the 
subcontractor default risk. 
 
Step 1: Identify scope 
The scope of this risk analysis is to understand dynamic outcome of the chosen risks in the 





Step 2: Identify factors affecting the outcome and rank them 
The factors that affect the outcomes are the risks that manifest in a PPP project. From ICRAM-
PPP, a list of high risks was identified and shown in Table 5.9. One risk was chosen to move 
forward with which is subcontractor default. 
Step 3: Identify driving forces that affect the factors (from step 2) 
The driving forces that affect the risks are the actions taken by each party that lead to escalation 
or resolving of the issue. These actions can be divided into formal or informal actions where 
informal actions include political/public/media pressures, threats of suing or contacting a party to 
negotiate. On the other hand, formal actions include lawsuits, licensing challenges, legal actions 
and claims. In this risk, possible actions for each party include: 
x Owner: withhold money from contractor, negotiate, settle, litigate, etc. 
x Contractor: withhold money from subcontractor, file claim against owner, stop work, etc. 
x Subcontractor: file a lien against project, stop work, negotiate, litigate, etc. 
Step 4: Develop combinations of the driving forces that lead to scenarios 
The driving forces (actions by each party) previously identified are used to create combinations of 
different plausible sequences in order to create a scenario.  
Step 5: Create scenarios  
The different scenarios created from step 5 are looked into in order to eliminate scenarios that are 












Table 5.9 List of scenarios for 2-party interactions between subcontractor and contractor 
Subcontractor (S) Contractor (C) Subcontractor (S) Scenario 
Asks for money, 
threatens to sue - 
OR Status Quo 
Denies/Withholds money 
from subcontractor – 







OR Stops work 
Scenario B 
 
Table 5.10 List of scenarios for 2-party interactions between IFA and contractor 
IFA (I) Contractor (C) IFA (I) Contractor (C) Scenario 
Sends notice to 
contractor - 
OR Status Quo 
Sends notice of 
potential claim 
against owner - 
OR No action 
Withholds money 
from contractor – 
OR Settlement 
Litigation – 
OR Negotiation Scenario 
C 
 
Table 5.11 List of scenarios for 3-party interactions 
IFA (I) Contractor (C) Subcontractor 
(S) 
4th Action (IFA) Scenario 
Withholds money 
from contractor – 
OR Status Quo 
Withholds money 
from subcontractor – 
OR Pay 
subcontractor 




- Scenario D 
Litigates 
contractor – 








- Scenario E 
Litigates 
contractor – 





Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the scenarios for the two-party interactions. Table 5.9 shows the 
scenarios between the subcontractor and contractor. The scenarios are read from left to right, 





they can either take an action (informal or formal) or decide on inaction. The first choice (A) is 
always the action and the second choice (B) is the inaction. In the first scenario: 
x Subcontractor asks for money (choice A) or does nothing, which is the status quo (choice 
B) 
x Contractor withholds money from subcontractor (choice A) or pays the subcontractor 
(choice B) 
x Subcontractor can file a claim (litigation, which is choice A) or settle with contractor 
(choice B) 
These sequences of actions create a scenario, which is then transformed into a game theory 
tree in order to create equations and solve it. The next section discusses interactional analysis and 
how the scenarios created are transformed into game trees and solved. 
 
5.4 Interactional Analysis for the ITR  
This section discusses the application of the Interactional Analysis framework to the ITR project. 
First, interactional analysis is applied to a two-party scenario to introduce its concepts. Next, the 
three-party interaction will be shown. 
 
 Two-Party Interactional Analysis 
This section discusses a two-party interactional analysis scenario for the ITR project. 
Interactional analysis is based on the idea of relations between parties in a certain situation and 
how their individual actions affect their individual payoffs in each scenario. Every PPP project 
consists of a contractual relationship between a public entity, which can be the government, state 
or another related entity, and a private entity, the concessionaire. In the ITR project, the public 
entity is the Indiana Finance Authority and the private entity is the ITRCC concessionaire 





In an interactional analysis, we focus on the actions between parties in a certain situation 
of risk. In this situation, the risk is subcontractor default. This risk occurred in the Indiana Toll 
Road project where the owner had a problem with part of the contractor’s work and did not pay 
them for it. The contractor in turn did not pay the subcontractor as well. It is a complete 
information game since all actors know the possible actions by all other actors. This type of game 
is solved using sub-game perfect equilibrium, which results in one equilibrium point (Selten 
1975).  
The first scenario is Scenario A from Table 5.9. This is a two-party analysis between the 
subcontractor and contractor. Figure 5.3 shows the game theoretic diagram for this situation. 
There are three levels of actions, starting with the subcontractor. In each level, there are two 
branches, left branch that represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.  
Figure 5.3 is read as follows: 
x Subcontractor can threaten to sue (informal action) or maintain status quo (no 
informal action). If subcontractor takes the choice on the right branch, decides on 
status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action 
if the subcontractor chooses the left branch. 
x Contractor responds to subcontractor’s informal action where he can either withhold 
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no 
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the 
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch 
and withholds money, the subcontractor has the next choice of action. 
x In this final level, the subcontractor can either take a formal action, which is filing a 
claim or no formal action, which is negotiation.  
Under each choice, the payoff for each actor if the choice was taken is shown. A description of 





x Uaǻb: utility of actor “a” under the request/benefit of actor “b”. Using an example 
from Scenario A, in the second action where the contractor makes a choice. If the 
contractor gives money to the subcontractor, this means that this action is requested 
by (or to the benefit of) the subcontractor so its payoff is USǻS (read as utility of 
subcontractor for the request of subcontractor) whereas the payoff for the contractor 
is UCǻS (read as utility of contractor for the request of subcontractor). The maximum 
payoff an actor can get is if the actor gets a utility for their request (Uaǻa), while the 
minimum payoff an actor can get is a utility for the request of the opposing actor 
(Uaǻb). 
x Įa: transaction cost for informal action taken by actor a 

































As shown in Figure 5.3, the payoffs for each action are listed first for the subcontractor 
followed by the contractor’s payoff. When an action is taken, the payoff is reduced by the cost of 
this action. So when the subcontractor takes as informal action (threaten to sue), the cost shows 
up under “give money” with Įa subtracted from the utility. This game is solved using backward 
induction. Since there are two actions under each level and there are three levels, there is a total 
of eight possibilities in this game. The solution is shown in Appendix C. 
 After the game is solved, a set of equations is extracted which provides criteria for the 
eight possibilities under the game. When criteria are met under one of these eight possibilities, a 
certain outcome is reached. Monte Carlo simulation is performed to get the probability of the 
outcomes (Molenaar et al. 2010, Naderpajouh 2013). Anylogic software is used to perform these 
simulations. Values for the parameters that were chosen are shown in Table 5.12. Since exact 
numbers for the cost of informal or formal cost are unavailable, values were chosen that depict 
the closest distribution for these costs. Changing these values would change the results for some 
of the scenarios therefore it is important to try out different variations and settling on the one that 
shows the closest version of the reality in a project. 
The values for each of the nine parameters are shown and are kept constant throughout 
the four sub-scenarios with the exception of one parameter that is changed. For example, under 
high formal cost, the transaction cost for formal action is increased to a uniform value between 









Table 5.12 Value of Parameters for Scenario A 





ĮS Cost of informal action by 
the subcontractor 
Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮC Cost of informal action by 
the contractor 
Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 








USǻS Utility of subcontractor 
for its request  
Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
USǻC Utility of subcontractor 
for request by contractor 
0 0 0 0 
UCǻC Utility of contractor for 
its request  
Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UCǻS Utility of contractor for 
request by subcontractor 
0 0 0 0 
PL Probability of 
subcontractor winning 
litigation 
Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55) Normal(0.15,0.35) 
PS Probability of 
subcontractor winning 
negotiation 









Figure 5.4 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario A 
Legend: 
x-axis: range of payoffs received for each party (where the subcontractor is yellow and the 
contractor is blue)  
y-axis: count of times this range of payoffs was received out of 1000 simulations 
This game was simulated and the results are shown in Figure 5.4. Simulation shows that 
the Nash equilibrium is negotiation in all four sub-scenarios for the majority of the simulations. 
Filing a claim is never reached as it provides a lower payoff than the alternatives. The x-axis 
shows the range of payoffs received for each party where the subcontractor is yellow and the 
contractor is blue. The y-axis shows the count of how many times this range of payoffs was 
received out of 1000 simulations. In the base case, it can be noticed that the contractor has a 
higher count for high payoffs than the subcontractor. Each scenario can be compared to the base 
case in order to check the effect of changing a parameter on the payoffs received. For example, 





the left, which means that their payoffs are decreasing compared to the base case. On the other 
hand, the payoffs for the contractor increase, as can be seen (in Figure 5.4) with the payoffs 
shifting towards the right. The number of times negotiation as the Nash equilibrium decreases and 
the number of times where status quo as the equilibrium increases, which explains the increase in 
payoffs for the contractor since payoffs for negotiation is higher than for status quo for the 
contractor. In the case of high probability of winning negotiation, negotiation is the Nash 
equilibrium for 943 out of 1000 simulations. It can be noticed that the payoffs for the 




Figure 5.5 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario B 
 
 
The second scenario is Scenario B from Table 5.9. This is a two-party analysis between 
the subcontractor and contractor. Figure 5.5 shows the game theoretic diagram for this situation. 
There are three levels of actions, starting with the subcontractor. In each level, there two 
branches, one left branch that represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.  





x Subcontractor can threaten to sue (informal action) or maintain status quo (no 
informal action). If subcontractor takes the choice on the right branch, decides on 
status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action 
if the subcontractor chooses the left branch. 
x Contractor responds to subcontractor’s informal action where he can either withhold 
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no 
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the 
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch 
and withholds money, the subcontractor has the next choice of action. 
x In this final level, the subcontractor can either take a formal action, which is filing a 
claim or no formal action, which is stopping work.  
 
Equations for the payoffs received are shown in Figure 5.5 for each party at each action. 
Simulations were performed for this scenario and the parameters chosen are presented in Table 
5.14 and the simulation results shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
Table 5.14 Value of Parameters for Scenario B 
 Base Case High Formal Cost High Probability of 
winning Litigation 
High Probability of 
winning Negotiation 
ĮS Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮC Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ȕS Uniform(0.15-
0.25) 
Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
USǻS Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
USǻC 0 0 0 0 
UCǻC Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UCǻS 0 0 0 0 
PL Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55) Normal(0.15,0.35) 








Figure 5.6 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario B 
Scenario C 
 





The third scenario we will discuss is Scenario C from Table 5.10. This is a two-party 
analysis between the IFA and contractor. Figure 5.7 shows the game theoretic diagram for this 
situation. There are four levels of actions, starting with the IFA. In each level, there two branches, 
one left branch that represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.  The 
diagram is read as follows: 
x IFA can withhold money from the contractor (informal action) or maintain status quo 
(no informal action). If IFA takes the choice on the right branch, decides on status 
quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action if the 
IFA chooses the left branch. 
x Contractor responds to the IFA’s informal action where he can either withhold 
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no 
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the 
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch 
and withholds money, IFA has the next choice of action. 
x Next action is performed by the IFA where the choices are either sending a formal 
notice to the contractor for the incorrect work (formal action) or settling with 
contractor (no formal action). 
x In this final level, the contractor can either choose litigation (formal action) or 
negotiation (no formal action).  
Equations for the payoffs received are shown in Figure 5.7 for each party at each action. 









Table 5.13 Value of Parameters for Scenario C 
 Base Case High Formal Cost High Probability of 
winning Litigation 
High Probability of 
winning Negotiation 
Įi Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮC Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ȕi Uniform(0.15-
0.25) 
Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
ȕC Uniform(0.15-
0.25) 
Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
Uiǻi Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UiǻC 0 0 0 0 
UCǻC Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UCǻi 0 0 0 0 
PL Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55) Normal(0.15,0.35) 
PN Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55) 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the results of the simulations for the four scenarios. All cases are 
compared to the base case in order to see how changing one parameter affects the payoffs of the 
actors. In the case of high formal costs, payoffs for the contractor decrease while payoffs for the 
IFA increase. This is because the Nash equilibrium shifts toward the start of the game so it is 
more likely to end at status quo and plan modification than go through formal costs.. it can be 
seen that litigation is never a Nash equilibrium regardless of what scenario we look at. In cases of 
high probability for winning negotiation or litigation, it is observed that the payoffs for the IFA 
(in orange) decrease, shifting towards the right whereas the payoffs for the contractor (in blue) 
increase, shifting towards the right. The best sub-scenarios for each actor can be observed from 
looking at the four bar charts. For the IFA, the best scenarios are the top two (base case and high 
formal costs) whereas for the contractor are the bottom two (high probability of winning 







Figure 5.8 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario C 
 
 
 Three-Party Interactional Analysis 
Expanding on the two-party interactional analysis, a new dimension is introduced by adding one 
more party to the scenario. Previous literature only discussed two parties in game theoretic 
concepts; hence this dissertation aims to introduce a new idea. This section discusses three-party 














Figure 5.9 3-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario D 
 
Figure 5.9 shows the game theoretic framework for the three-party interaction. The three 
parties involved are: IFA, contractor and subcontractor. There are three levels of actions, starting 
with the IFA. In each level, there two branches, one left branch that represents an action and a 
right branch, which represents no action.  The logic in the diagram is read as follows: 
x IFA can withhold money from the contractor (informal action) or maintain status quo 
(no informal action). If IFA takes the choice on the right branch, decides on status 
quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action if the 
IFA chooses the left branch. 
x Contractor responds to the IFA’s informal action where he can either withhold 
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no 
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the 
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch 





x In this final level, the subcontractor can either take a formal action, which is filing a 
claim or no formal action, which is negotiating with the contractor.  
 
Table 5.15 Value of Parameters for Scenario D 
 Base Case High Formal Cost High Probability of 
winning Litigation 
High Probability of 
winning Negotiation 
Įi Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮC Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ȕS Uniform(0.15-
0.25) 
Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
USǻS Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
USǻC 0 0 0 0 
UCǻC Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UCǻS 0 0 0 0 
UiǻS Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UiǻC 0 0 0 0 
PL Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55) Normal(0.15,0.35) 
PS Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55) 
 
 






Table 5.15 shows the values of parameters used for this scenario. This game was 
simulated for 1000 simulations and the results are shown in Figure 5.10. Simulation shows that 
high formal cost shifts the game away from litigation so it ends before any of the actors can do 
formal actions. In all scenarios, negotiation is the Nash equilibrium in the majority of the 
simulations. Litigation is a close contender when the probability of winning litigation is high. 
Subcontractor gets highest count of high payoffs in the case of high probability of winning 
negotiation. For the contractor, the base case and high formal cost sub-scenarios provide highest 
payoff since their payoff histogram shifts towards the right (increasing ranges of payoff). For the 








Figure 5.11 shows the game theoretic framework for the three-party interaction for 





subcontractor’s action in the end of the game. In the final level, the subcontractor can either take 
an informal action, which is stop work (instead of litigation like in Scenario D) or no informal 
action, which is negotiating with the contractor.  Table 5.16 shows the values of parameters used 
for the simulation.  
Table 5.16 Value of Parameters for Scenario E 












Figure 5.12 shows the result of the simulation. It shows that the Nash equilibrium is 
negotiation in 950 times out of 1000. The spread of payoffs shows that the contractor has a higher 
count of high payoffs than subcontractor and IFA. The parameters were varied but there was 
close to no change in the simulation results so they were not shown here. This shows that this 
scenario is not sensitive to changes in the value of transaction cost or probabilities of winning 





































































Figure 5.13 3-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario F 
Figure 5.13 shows the game theoretic framework for the three-party interaction for 
Scenario F. The three parties involved are: IFA, contractor and subcontractor. There are four 
levels of actions, starting with the IFA. In each level, there two branches, one left branch that 
represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.  The logic in the diagram is 
read as follows: 
x IFA can withhold money from the contractor (informal action) or maintain status quo 
(no informal action). If IFA takes the choice on the right branch, decides on status 
quo, the game ends here; otherwise the contractor has the next choice of action if the 
IFA chooses the left branch. 
x Contractor responds to the IFA’s informal action where he can either withhold 
money from subcontractor (informal action) or give the subcontractor money (no 
informal action). If the contractor takes the choice on the right branch, gives the 
subcontractor money, then the game ends. If the contractor chooses the left branch 
and withholds money, the subcontractor has the next choice of action. 
x Subcontractor can either file a lien (formal action), or no formal action, which is 
negotiating with the contractor.  
x The final action is performed by the IFA where they can wither choose litigation 





Table 5.17 Value of Parameters for Scenario F 
 Base Case High Formal Cost High Probability of 
winning Litigation 
High Probability of 
winning Negotiation 
Įi Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮC Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ȕi Uniform(0.15-
0.25) 
Uniform(0.2-0.35) Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
ȕS Uniform(0.2-0.3) Uniform(0.2-0.3) Uniform(0.2-0.3) Uniform(0.2-0.3) 
USǻS Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
USǻC 0 0 0 0 
UCǻC Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UCǻS 0 0 0 0 
PL Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.65) Normal(0.15,0.35) 
PS Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.65) 
 
Table 5.17 shows the values of parameters chosen for this scenario. Simulations were performed 
the results shown in Figure 5.14. It can be noticed that the payoff distributions are similar in all 
cases. However, in the high probability of winning litigation, the subcontractor has the best 
payoff distribution since it shifts towards the right while the IFA and subcontractor have the 
worst payoff distribution since it shifts towards the left. Stopping at the second action (plan 































Table 5.18 Value of Parameters for Scenario G 
 Base Case High Probability of 
winning Negotiation 
Įi Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮC Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮS Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ȕi Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
USǻS Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
USǻC 0 0 
UCǻC Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UCǻS 0 0 
PL Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.35) 
PS Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55) 
 
Table 5.18 shows the values of parameters chosen for this scenario. Simulations were 
performed the results shown in Figure 5.15. It can be noticed that the payoff distributions are 
similar in both cases. However, in the high probability of winning negotiation, the subcontractor 
has a slightly better payoff distribution since it shifts towards the right while the IFA and 
subcontractor have a slightly worse payoff distribution since it shifts towards the left. Stopping at 
the second action (plan modification) is always the Nash equilibrium regardless of which sub-






Figure 5.16 Simulation for 2-Party Game between subcontractor and contractor- Scenario G 
 
In order to validate the model and results, the experts at the ITR were first shown the 
scenarios obtained to validate that all possible scenarios were taken into consideration. These 
seven scenarios were found to be the only plausible scenarios that depict how this risk could 
enfold. The results were also discussed with them and were approved by the experts as credible 





 Discussion of the ITR Project Case Study 
The Indiana Toll Road project is a unique project because it has faced problems since its start 
specifically the bankruptcy process. This chapter presented the decision tool used to discover high 
risks in the project and model the interactions between parties through the creation of strategies in 
order to study the different outcomes and choose the optimal strategy. Tables 5.19 to 5.21 present 







Table 5.19 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (Subcontractor Vs. Contractor) 
Subcontractor (S) Contractor (C) Subcontractor (S) Scenario Expected 
Payoffs 
 
Asks for money, 
threatens to sue  
OR Status Quo 
 
Denies/Withholds money 
from subcontractor  
OR Pay subcontractor 
Litigation  
OR Settlement 




Scenario B S: 218.1 
C: 283.5 
 
Table 5.20 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (IFA Vs. Contractor) 
IFA (I) Contractor (C) IFA (I) Contractor (C) Scenario Expected Payoff 
Sends notice to 
contractor  
OR Status Quo 
Sends notice of 












Table 5.21 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (IFA Vs. Contractor Vs. Subcontractor) 
IFA (I) Contractor (C) Subcontractor (S) 4th Action (IFA) Scenario Expected 
Payoff 
 
Withholds money from 
contractor  
 
Withhold money from 
subcontractor  
Files a lien  













OR Status Quo OR Pay subcontractor Litigates contractor  
OR Settles with 
contractor 
Scenario F S: 868.3 
I: 796.3 
C: 51.3 
Stops work – 





Scenario E S: 311.3 
I: 240.8 
C: 497.9 
Litigates contractor  
OR Settles with 
contractor 









Tables 5.19 to 5.21 present the expected payoffs for all scenarios for the actors involved. 
The expected payoff is calculated as the summation of expected payoffs for the game (average for 
the range multiplied by number of times it occurs in the game). Comparing the scenarios between 
subcontractor and contractor (4 and 5), Scenario A produces better payoffs for both actors. Hence 
it is always bad for both actors if the subcontractor chooses to stop work over settling and should 
be avoided at all times.   
Table 5.21 presents the expected payoffs for the three party games. Comparing the two 
games where each actor only plays once (Scenario D and 0’), Scenario D provides a higher 
expected payoff for both the IFA and subcontractor but a lower payoff for the contractor. 
Comparing scenarios F and G where the IFA takes an additional action in the end shows that 
Scenario F produces higher expected payoffs for all actors. 
 
Table 5.22 Best scenarios for each actor 
Actor 
Best 2-Party Scenario 
Best 3-Party ScenarioIFA Vs.Contractor Contractor Vs. 
Subcontractor 
IFA Scenario C í Scenario G 
Contractor Scenario C Scenario A Scenario E 
Subcontractor í Scenario A Scenario G 
 
Table 5.22 shows the best scenarios for each actor in the 2-party and 3-party games. For the 3 
party games, IFA and subcontractor have the same best scenario, which is Scenario E so it is in 
their best interest to play that strategy. The subcontractor should file a lien (or resolve issue with 
contractor) followed by IFA’s action to litigate (or settle with contractor). In the two-party game 
between the contractor and subcontractor, the subcontractor should choose the strategy to 







This chapter showcased the research methodology through applying the ITR case study. First, 
ICRAM-PPP was applied and discussed to show how the risks can be assessed. Next, thresholds 
were chosen and high risks were obtained. One of these high risks was chosen for further 
analysis. Using scenario analysis, seven scenarios were created for the risk (three two-party 
scenarios and four three-party scenarios). Using game theoretic concepts, the scenarios were 
converted into games and solved to create equations. Simulations were performed to analyze the 
differences in payoffs obtained from changing the parameters. Finally, tables were created to 
tabulate the best scenarios for each actor and extract their best strategies. The following chapter 







This chapter starts by introducing the foundation of negotiation theory and discussing 
renegotiations in PPP projects. Interactional analysis is then introduced to simulate a 
renegotiation scenario for PPP projects. A case study, the Tanzania Railway Project, is chosen to 
apply the interactional analysis framework and simulate different scenarios that could possibly 
occur. 
 
6.2 Negotiation Theory 
Negotiation theory is the study of interactions between parties in a negotiation setting. Under 
these settings, each party has an agenda to fulfill and they interact together to reach a conclusion. 
The four main foundations of negotiation theory are decision analysis, behavioral decision-
making, game theory, and negotiation analysis (Sebenius 2007). Decision analysis is the study of 
decisions for one player where he/she seeks to optimize the received payoff based on several 
decisions they have available. Behavioral decision-making adds the behavioral/psychological 
aspects into decision-making and how players behave in a situation. Game theory is the study of 
how players act or make a choice in a given scenario to reach an optimal payoff under a game of 
n-players. Negotiation analysis is based on decision theory and game theory and seeks to give 
prescriptive advice to a party in a negotiation scenario (Sebenius 1992).  
The idea behind negotiation theory is to study the interactions between parties in order to 





many researchers have looked into is the idea of balance of power (Aguirre 2008). In any 
contractual relationship, power may not be balanced between the parties due to various reasons 
such as asymmetry of information between them, resources they have available, and tactics they 
can use such as threats, coalitions and rewards (Aguirre 2008). Habeeb (1988) defines power as 
composing of two main components: structural power and behavior power. Structural power 
refers to an actor’s resources and capabilities while behavioral power refers to the actor’s 
behavior and how they use their resources. Actions taken by each actor are also referred to as 
negotiation tactics, which include threats and coalition formation (Aguirre 2008). Zartman (1976) 
added three more definitions of power to the structural and behavioral components, which are: 
strategic, processual and integrative. Strategic approach refers to the strategy or path that an actor 
takes to secure their end goal and is considered the foundation for game theory (Alfredson and 
Cungu 2008). The processual approach assumes that the negotiation is a learning process for the 
actors in which they follow each other’s actions before taking the next action. The final approach 
is the integrative approach, which looks at negotiation as a way to create an outcome of mutual 
gain where all parties can win.  
According to Kennedy et al. (1987), more than 80% of the negotiation time is spent in 
arguments. These arguments adversely affect the negotiation process and delay its resolution. 
Peña-Mora and Wang (1998) developed a negotiation tool using negotiation theory and game 
theory. They defined five forms of negotiations: fighting, facilitation, mediation, arbitration, and 
adjudication where the actors have control over the negotiation result in the beginning (fighting) 
and lose this control as the negotiation form reaches adjudication (Peña-Mora and Wang 1998). 
This dissertation focuses on three-party interactional analysis to evaluate possible scenarios in 
which a negotiation process can pan out and show the outcomes/payoffs for all actors under each 






6.3 Negotiation/Renegotiation in PPP projects 
 Renegotiations: Definition and Causes 
Parties enter into a partnership in order to deal with risks and uncertainties in the project 
jointly instead of having to rewrite the contract whenever a change occurs (Zou 2012). An 
important risk that is inevitable in projects is renegotiation. Renegotiations occur in PPP projects 
regardless of their sector, duration and location. A renegotiation can be defined as a change in the 
original contract signed by the parties. It is a severe risk that occurs in many projects and can be 
triggered by the occurrence of other risks. Examples of such triggers include modifications to the 
originally agreed upon contract terms such as reduction/increase in the level of service, contract 
extension, reduction/increase in tariffs and changes in the financial agreement (Guasch et al. 
2014). Other causes include changes in the risk-sharing mechanism between the parties and 
changes in project scope such as additions to the contract. However, in cases where changes are 
written in the contract, such as tariff adjustment they are not considered renegotiation cases 
(Guasch et al. 2014).  After renegotiation, both parties agree on a new contract with the added 
terms such as extension of time, additional payments or changed scope.  
Domingues and Zlatkovic (2015) classified renegotiation triggers into four areas: 
“institutional and regulatory frameworks, contract design, macro-economic environment and 
political and social environment”. There are several causes behind contract renegotiations, some 
of which fall under these four areas. The list below shows some of these causes (Bitran et al. 
2012, Guasch et al. 2014, Shlyk 2009).  
x New administration taking over 
x Opportunistic behavior of government or firm 
x Political instability 
x Social opposition to a project or to an enforcement of tolls in case of roadway projects 





x Vague legislation  
x Poor contract design  
x Long duration of the concession and inability to consider all contingencies 
x Changes in performance criteria 
x Recession 
x Economic instability 
x Incomplete contract (since it is extremely costly if not impossible to create a contract that 
encompasses all possible risks, outcomes and mitigation strategies) 
x Failure to achieve performance indicators  
x Information asymmetry 
x Lack of trust between parties 
x Instability of either party 
Opportunistic behavior can be seen during the bidding phase, for example, the private party 
can lower their costs if they believe that they can renegotiate at a later time and retrieve this cost. 
The public party can also be opportunistic by trying to change contractual terms later on and 
relieving itself from some of the risks by transferring it to the private party (Garvin 2009). 
Opportunistic behavior can also manifest during contract execution or during proposal of changes 
in the contract (Brux 2009). Xiong and Zhang (2016) proposed a model to show the value of 
renegotiations in PPP projects using real option theory to find out whether a renegotiation-
allowed contract is better than a renegotiation-proof one.  
Reside and Mendoza (2010) introduced political risk as the government’s action to make 
changes to regulations or investment and they presented examples of how currency risk has led to 
renegotiations. An example is the tariff freeze in Argentina as a means for mitigating the effects 





reduction in the expected traffic demand, and then the Asian crisis in 1997, which caused a 
devaluation of the Thailand Baht, all of which led to renegotiations. Other crises were the 
currency collapse in Brazil in 1999 and in the Dominican Republic in 2003 (Reside and Mendoza 
2010). 
Renegotiations affect all parties such as the government, private sector and general public. 
Consequences of renegotiations include (Guasch et al. 2014): 
x Higher costs to the government  
x Loss of government credibility  
x Public opposition to changes made 
x Public boycotting the project  
Renegotiations can lead to an extension in contract duration, certain tax exemptions, or extra 
subsidy from the government (Ho 2006). Guasch et al. (2014) suggested that the average 
percentages of renegotiations occur in the construction phase 55% of the time and after the 
construction phase 45% of the time for the countries they studied. However, they did not give 
details as to when exactly they occurred or if it was a cascading risk or not. No previous research 
has focused on risk outcomes and if the risk was eliminated or resolved after the renegotiation or 
if caused more problems afterward. Renegotiations can either be seen as a risk that affects 
projects or as a consequence of other risks that occur. In this research, renegotiation is looked at 
as an outcome or consequence of other risks occurring. Table 6.1 shows a summary of the 
statistics available on the number of renegotiated projects. The percentage of renegotiation varies 
according to the country, where it was about 30% in East Asia, 50% in Latin America and 60% 
from 13 developing countries (Guasch et al. 2006, Reside and Mendoza 2010 and Woodhouse 
2006). The number of renegotiations per project also varies from an average of 2 renegotiations in 







Table 6.1 Statistics on renegotiated projects 

Source Location an time period of 
study 
Total projects Renegotiated Projects 
Guasch et 
al. (2007) 
1980s to 2000 in Latin 
America 
307 projects 162 (53 firms’ calls, 15 joint calls 
and 94 governments’ call) 
Woodhouse 
(2006) 
Electric power projects from 
13 developing countries 
34 energy 
projects 
21 projects underwent renegotiation 
Engel et al. 
(2009) 
1993 and 2006 in Chile 50 concession 
projects 
148 renegotiations or three 




1986-2008 in East Asia  About 2700 
projects 
826 renegotiated projects 
Bitran et 
al. (2012) 
1993 to 2010 in Chile, 
Columbia and Peru 
61 projects 540 renegotiations 
Mean: 2.2, 20.5 and 4.8 per country 
respectively. 




6 renegotiated projects 
 
One of the triggers of renegotiation is when the government seeks to construct a new 
building or roadway near the existing PPP project that may affect its revenues. Some contracts 
started including a non-compete clause to prevent this from happening like in the “91 Express 
Lanes” project in California where the concessionaire filed a lawsuit against CalTrans (California 
Department of Transportation) for attempting to expand on a nearby facility, thereby stopping its 
attempt. In an attempt to reduce renegotiations and the costs incurred as a consequence, the 
Chilean government incorporated a cap between 10-30% for price changes during the concession 
period (Engel et al. 2009). Engel et al. (2009) studied 16 concessions and reported a price 
increase of $1.6 billion during the concession period as compared to the cap price of $483M 






 Triggers of renegotiations 
Renegotiations can take place due to instigations from the government, private party or an 
outside party. Governments renegotiate in order to appease the general public about a new 
project, eliminate their opposition, gain more votes in upcoming elections, increase their profit-
share or readjust risk distribution. An example of government instigation is when the Malaysian 
government tried to renegotiate contracts with independent power producers in order to gain back 
some profit from the “guaranteed off-takes” they had agreed on (Reside and Mendoza 2010). The 
private party renegotiates when it feels that it may have the upper hand due to more knowledge in 
a project or weak government in order to increase its profit. Outside parties can directly or 
indirectly affect PPP projects such as public protest to a project like the Vasco da Gama project 
discussed in a later section.  
 Cases of renegotiations 
Guasch (2004) examined 1,000 PPP projects between the 1980s and 2000 in Latin America 
and found that 30% of these projects were renegotiated after an average of 2.2 years only. The 
result of these renegotiations led to a delay in project target for 69% of the projects, an increase in 
agreed tariffs for 62% of the contracts, and a reduction of the investment for 62% of the projects 
(Guasch 2004, Brux 2009). Engel et al. (2009) studied 50 concession projects between 1993 and 
2006 in Chile and reported a sum of 148 renegotiations or an average of three renegotiations per 
project with an increase in the total investment from $8.4 billion to $11.3 billion. Woodhouse 
(2006) examined 34 energy projects and reported that 21 of them underwent mutual or unilateral 
renegotiations. Reside and Mendoza (2010) estimated 826 renegotiated projects or 30 percent of 
projects in East Asia from 1986 to 2008 as well as about 20 percent of renegotiated projects 
around the world at that time. 





Owned Enterprise) BOT in Shanghai where the government decided to modify their policy and 
change the fixed rate of return that was in existence (Choi et al. 2009). Negotiations were 
unsuccessful and the private company eventually exited the project and sold its assets.  
 
6.4 Interactional Analysis application in Negotiations 
There are several modeling/simulation techniques available such as agent-based modeling, 
system dynamics and game theory. Table 6.2 shows some of the previous research conducted on 
negotiations using different modeling techniques.  
 
Table 6.2 Previous Research showing modeling techniques for negotiations 
Source Description of work 
Carneiro et al. 
(2013)  
Applied case-based reasoning to propose an online dispute resolution 
mechanism in legal cases 
Leu et al. (2014) Used Bayesian theory to analyze the opponent's historical offers and 
approximately predict the opponent's preference over procurement price 
negotiations 
Xue et al. (2005) Proposed an agent-based multi-attribute negotiation framework for 
supply chain coordination issues. They also commented that simulating 
behaviors was a challenge and limitation in their research 
Sycara (1990) Used case-based reasoning and multi-attribute utility theory to model 
labor negotiations 
Zlotkin and 
Rosenschein (1989)  






Literature has proposed the use of game theory to model negotiations or interactions between 
parties (Ho 2006, Shen et al. 2007, Blockuis et al. 2012 and Naderpajouh et al. 2014). In this 
research, game theory has been chosen to apply interactional analysis because it is the optimal 
method to model interactions between parties as it focuses on actions and payoffs of players in a 
game. It is based on the interactions of parties in a situation where each of them has a set of 
actions/counter-actions that they can take. These actions dictate what their payoff is based on how 
the game proceeds. 
Game theory frameworks or models consist of three main aspects: “players, strategies and 
payoffs” (Glumac et al 2015). Game theory can be used to portray the opponents’ behavior, 
strategy and payoff for each move they make (Ho 2006). It can be used to solve situations of 
conflict by estimating the “equilibrium point of conflict” (Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008). It 
can portray both competitive and cooperative behavior of players. Game theory has been used in 
various fields such as psychology, economics and political science. Parsons and Wooldridge 
(2002) state seven important properties of frameworks for multi-agent interactions: 
1. Guaranteed success: when an agreement is ensured to happen. This is reached through 
Nash equilibrium in game theory where Nash equilibrium represents the best-case 
solution for all parties so they do not have any incentive to deviate from it. 
2. Maximizing social welfare: when the negotiation result maximizes the aggregate utility 
of all actors.  
3. Pareto efficiency: occurs in the absence of another outcome that would increase an 
actor’s utility without reducing another actor’s utility 
4. Individual rationality: when rationality of all actors’ is the best strategy for all of them to 
play. 
5. Stability: such as Nash Equilibrium. 





7. Distribution: occurs when the framework reduces communication among actors. 
Several authors (Asgari et al. 2014, Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008, Madani 2010, 
Madani and Lund 2011, Parsons and Wooldridge 2002, Samsura et al. 2009, Zlotkin and 
Rosenschein 1989) proposed the use of game theory in various negotiations settings to analyze 
and portray parties’ behaviors. Asgari et al. (2014) proposed a game theory framework to model 
resource management and sharing among subcontractors. Naderpajouh et al. (2014) used game 
theory to model social opposition to infrastructure projects. Madani (2010) applied game theory 
to address conflicts in managing water resources. Samsura et al. (2009) used game theory to 
model the behavior of actors in situations of decision-making related to land development. It can 
be seen that game theory has been an important and effective technique in identifying the effects 
of interactions between actors on the collective decision-making process in diverse settings. 
However, all these researches have only looked at two-party interactions. 
 
6.5 Tanzania Railway Project 
 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the Tanzania Railways project as the renegotiation case study in this 
dissertation. Multiple scenarios were created using interactional analysis between two and three 
parties to show possible outcomes and best strategies. This is performed through three steps: the 
first step is applying ICRAM-PPP to the project to get the high risks, the second step is creating 
appropriate scenarios using scenario analysis, and the third step is applying the Interactional 







This section describes the historic background of the project, parties involved and then introduces 
the problems they faced. Data collection for this case study included analysis of published papers 
and newspaper articles.  
This project involves the rehabilitation, development and operation of the 2700 km railway. It 
involves an investment by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) for up to $44 million for a 
25-year concession contract. The Government of Tanzania entered into contract with a 
consortium led by RITES of India by forming a new company, Tanzania Railways Limited or 
TRL (International Finance Corporation 2016). Table 6.3 shows the parties involved, their roles 
and concerns in the negotiation scenarios. 
Table 6.3 Roles and Concerns of the Three Parties in TRL 
Party Role Concern 
Concessionaire 
Contractual party that is responsible 
for rehabilitating, developing and 
operating the railway.  
x Delay of ($44M) investment 
promised by IFC 
x Strike induced by the Union 
Government 
Contractual party that represents the 
project owner. 
x Strike induced by the Union 
x Project delay caused by potential 
union-induced strike 
Parliament 
Legislative body responsible for 
passing acts to promote privatization 
and improve road network. 
x Lower asset performance 
compared to before the 
concession 
x Government’s increased 
financial involvement (as 
compared to the original 
contractual terms for the PPP 
project) 
 
The timeline of events that led to problems in the concession are as follows (Highbeam 
Business 2008, Phipps 2009, Shlyk 2009, Worldbank Document ICR00001299  2010, Railway 
Gazette 2011): 





x January 2008: Tanzania Railway Association Workers Union (TRAWU) requested salary 
increase (that was previously promised to them by the Government) 
x February 2008: TRAWU threatened to strike if their requests were not heeded to 
x March 2008: TRL met the Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MOID) and Reli 
Asset Holding Company (RAHCO), which is a government agency tasked with securing 
and providing railway infrastructure, to discuss the union’s request but no decision was 
made 
x April 2008: TRAWU went on strike. TRL met MOID again and the Government of 
Tanzania (GoT) where GoT decided to contribute towards the salary increase. Workers 
and media requested to revoke the concession contract. There were criticisms about TRL 
and the IFC loan was delayed. TRL suggested that GoT approach the Government of 
India to ask for a loan but that was refused.  
x Threats of cancellations 
x November 2008: TRL sought to renegotiate the contract and made three requests: 1) 
concession fee cancellation for the first five years, 2) exemption from the fuel levy for the 
fuel used for the maintenance of roads, 3) shifting of the concession’s focus to rolling 
stock investments with GoT focusing on all infrastructure investments.  
x Members of Parliament (MPs) emphasized that the asset’s performance under the 
concession was lower than before the concession. Many of the MPs were from opposition 
parties so they called for cancellation of the contract. 
x 2009 RAHCO denied any renegotiation. There were delays in payment of wages that led 
to industrial action by the workers. Eventually RITES pulled out its staff and GoT took 





In this chapter, the parties involved in the risk scenarios and interactional analyses are: 
Government of Tanzania, Concessionaire, and Parliament. The Parliament is introduced in the 
three-party analysis. 
 ICRAM-PPP for Tanzania Railways Project 
ICRAM-PPP was applied to the Tanzania Railways project to identify the spectrum of risks 
involved. Extensive literature review about the project was conducted prior to applying ICRAM-
PPP. Tables 6.4 to 6.6 present the results for the macro, market and project level analysis. The 
risk assessments for each level were assumed based on the literature review conducted on each 
risk. Same steps were taken to calculate the weight and weighted assessment for ICRAM-PPP as 
for the Indiana Toll Road case study discussed in Chapter 5 (and shown in Appendix B). For the 
market level, the “higher level impact” marks the activities that are affected by the macro level 
and for the project levels, the “higher level impact” marks the activities that are affected by the 
market or macro levels. These activities were found to be impacted by the higher level based on 
literature review conducted by the researcher on these risks. Appendix A shows the list of the 






Table 6.4 Tanzania Railways Project - Macro Level Risks 







1.orc=Political continuity/Stability of Government 0.026465471 75 1.984910328 
2.orc=Attitude toward foreign/private investors and profit 0.01935436 50 0.967717996 
3.orc=Nationalization/Expropriation/sequestration of assets 0.01766811 75 1.325108225 
4.orc=Enforceability of contracts 0.019417852 75 1.456338899 
5.orc=Government Incentives 0.017721707 50 0.886085343 
6.orc=Inadequate/Absence/Change of national PPP laws and standardized models for 
PPP projects 0.014765615 75 1.10742115 
7.orc=Changes in country/region legislation and regulation 0.017940219 75 1.345516388 
8.orc=Monetary inflation 0.088888889 25 2.222222222 
9.orc=Economic growth and volatility 0.044444444 75 3.333333333 
10.orc=Bureaucratic delays 0.044444444 100 4.444444444 
11.orc=Required services (IT infrastructure, Communication, Transportation, etc.) 0.022222222 50 1.111111111 
Political 
Risks 
1.prc=Regional turbulences (war, etc.) 0.091358025 75 6.851851852 
2.prc=Dependence on or importance of major power network 0.045679012 75 3.425925926 
3.prc=Fragmented political structure (e.g. local and federal governments) 0.026111111 75 1.958333333 
5.prc=Institutional behaviors including nationalism, corruption, and dishonesty 0.017407407 75 1.305555556 
6.prc=Social conditions (e.g., population, density & wealth distribution) 0.017407407 75 1.305555556 
7.prc=Satisfying short-term interest of the governing body 0.026111111 75 1.958333333 
8.prc=Societal conflicts 0.046825397 100 4.682539683 
9.prc=Government reliability/creditworthiness/cooperation 0.036419753 50 1.820987654 
10.prc=Instability because of nonconstitutional changes 0.026014109 75 1.951058201 
Financial 
Risks 
1.frc=Actual laws versus practices for repatriation of capital 0.087575758 50 4.378787879 
2.frc=Current account balance 0.048257576 75 3.619318182 
3.frc=Capital flow 0.016085859 50 0.804292929 
4.frc=Foreign exchange reserves 0.067121212 50 3.356060606 
6.frc=Debt as GDP converted to US dollars 0.029141414 50 1.457070707 
7.frc=Capacity to service debt 0.029141414 50 1.457070707 
8.frc=Extent of deficit/surplus 0.021003788 100 2.100378788 
9.frc=Restrictions to refinancing schemes  0.016336279 100 1.633627946 
10.frc=Sources of revenue and major spending 0.018670034 75 1.400252525 








Table 6.5 Tanzania Railways Project - Market Level Risks 








Technology 1m=Investor’s technological advantage 0.101846091   25 2.546152275 
2m=Availability of basic construction technologies and equipment 0.101846091 1 41.1206133 4.187973724 
Contracts &  3m=Type of partnership 0.081259811   75 6.094485818 
Legal  4m=Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract 0.064788228 1 41.1206133 2.664131654 
Req. 5m=Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many agencies, delay in granting approvals) 0.051610961 1 41.1206133 2.122274368 
Resources 6m=Availability and quality of local… 0.030715218   75 2.303641382 
7m=Availability of construction material 0.045634039 1 51.40076662 2.345624578 
8m=Availability of skilled and unskilled labor 0.041968861   50 2.098443074 
9m=Labor cost/productivity 0.025036775   75 1.877758101 
10m=Availability of equipment and parts 0.019255087   75 1.444131488 
Financing 11m=Availability of financing  0.052814438 1 64.25095828 3.393378236 
12m=Tax and non tax incentives 0.035209625 1 64.25095828 2.262252157 
13m=Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate 0.035209625 1 51.40076662 1.809801726 
14m=Financial/Insurance market maturity and stability 0.035209625   75 2.640721887 
Business   15m=Interaction of foreign management… 0.047258882   50 2.362944109 
Cultural 16m=A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship 0.047258882   50 2.362944109 
Differences 17m=Risk management practices of parties involved 0.047258882   75 3.544416164 
 
Market  18m=Current market volume in core competency 0.03395472   25 0.848867993 
Potential 19m=Future market industry volume 0.03395472   50 1.697735985 
20m=Bidding volume index resulting in competition 0.03395472 1 51.40076662 1.745298623 
  21m=Stability of associated industries 0.03395472   75 2.546603978 













Table 6.6 Tanzania Railways Project - Project Level Risks 








Technology 1p=Problem with technology transfer and implementation 0.090026437 2 42.3196651 3.809888678 
2p=Retention of technological advantage 0.090026437   25 2.25066093 
Contracts  3p=Possibility of contractual disputes 0.028629828   75 2.147237106 
and  4p=Problems in dispute settlements due to country's laws 0.028629828   75 2.147237106 
Legal Issues 5p=Inadequate distribution of responsibilities/authorities/risk allocation 0.028629828   75 2.147237106 
6p=Problems in contract conditions 0.019086552   75 1.431491404 
7p=Capability and experience of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 0.019086552   75 1.431491404 
Resources 8p=Shortage of skilled and unskilled workers 0.042444219 2 42.3196651 1.796225115 
9p=Insolvency / default of subcontractor or operator or suppliers 0.084888437   75 6.366632777 
10p=Delay/unavailability/unreliability of material supply 0.042444219 2 42.3196651 1.796225115 
Design 11p=Delay with design and regulatory approvals 0.020738652 2 42.3196651 0.877652826 
12p=Complex/Defective design, error, and rework 0.020738652   75 1.555398932 
13p=Change orders/variations 0.031107979   75 2.333098398 
14p=Difficulties to meet construction programs 0.020738652   50 1.036932621 
15p=Unforeseen adverse ground conditions 0.020738652   50 1.036932621 
Quality 16p=Bad quality of materials 0.037913829 2 42.3196651 1.604500554 
17p=Bad quality of workmanship 0.037913829 2 42.3196651 1.604500554 
18p=Uncertainty regarding the quality required for maintenance 0.037913829   50 1.895691457 
Financing 19p=Financial difficulties because of tax or capital movement restrictions 0.046989871 1 64.2509583 3.019144263 
20p=Financial difficulties because of currency exchange rate 0.016965326 1 64.2509583 1.090038437 
21p=Drop in project revenue 0.021571033 1 64.2509583 1.385959525 
22p=Risk of non-payment/delayed-payment by public partner/Delay in annuity 0.016965326 1 64.2509583 1.090038437 
23p=Tariff problems 0.021571033 2 42.3196651 0.912878883 
Construction  24p=High costs of project operations 0.015137101   75 1.135282553 
and 25p=Third party delays 0.015137101   75 1.135282553 
 Cultural  26p=Safety/Security/Failure problems at project site 0.015137101   50 0.756855036 
Issues 27p=Managerial Issues 0.030274201   50 1.513710071 
28p=Organization/coordination/commitment risks between parties 0.030274201   100 3.027420142 
Other 29p=Weather or other natural disaster 0.045520863   25 1.138021569 
  30p=Physical damage to the project 0.022760431 1 51.4007666 1.169903622 





 Interactional Analysis for the Tanzania Railways Project 
This section discusses the application of the Interactional Analysis framework to the ITR project. 
First, interactional analysis is applied to a two-party scenario followed by its application to a 
three-party interaction. Similar to the Indiana Toll Road project case study, scenario analysis was 
performed for the Tanzania Railways Project to reach the possible scenarios. The following steps 
were taken for scenario analysis: 
Step 1: Identify scope 
The scope of this risk analysis is to understand dynamic outcome of the chosen risk in the 
Tanzania Railways project because of the actions taken by the parties to the risk. 
Step 2: Identify factors affecting the outcome and rank them. The factors that affect the outcomes 
are the risks that manifest in a PPP project. From ICRAM-PPP, a list of high risks was identified 
and one risk was chosen to move forward with, i.e., negotiation due to labor problems (previously 
discussed) and political problems (Parliament opposition). 
Step 3: Identify driving forces that affect the factors (from step 2) 
These actions can be divided into formal or informal actions where informal actions include 
political/public/media pressures, threats of suing or contacting a party to negotiate. On the other 
hand, formal actions include lawsuits, licensing challenges, legal actions and claims. In this risk, 
possible actions for each party include: 
x Government: deny negotiation/renegotiation, accept negotiation/ renegotiation or take 
over project. 
x Contractor: negotiate/renegotiate, take no action. 
Step 4: Develop combinations of the driving forces that lead to scenarios 
The driving forces (actions by each party) previously identified are used to create combinations of 





Step 5: Create scenarios  
The different scenarios created from step 5 are looked into in order to eliminate scenarios that are 
not realistic. Tables 6.7 to 6.9 present the final list of scenarios. For each actor, there is an action, 
A which is the informal/formal action they can take, and B, which is the inaction in that instance. 
Table 6.7 List of scenarios for 2-party interactions between government and concessionaire-part 1 
Concessionaire (C) Government (G) Concessionaire (C) Scenario 
Ask for loan 
OR Status Quo 
 




OR Settle Scenario A 
Renegotiate  
OR No further action Scenario B 
 










Ask for loan 
OR Status Quo 
Reject   
OR Settle Renegotiate  

























Ask for loan  














 Two-Party Interactional Analysis 
The first scenario is Scenario A from Table 6.7. This is a two-party analysis between the 
government and concessionaire. Figure 6.1 shows the game theoretic diagram for this situation. 





branches, a left branch that represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.  
Figure 6.1 is read as follows: 
x Concessionaire can ask the government for a loan (informal action) or maintain status 
quo (no informal action). If the concessionaire takes the choice on the right branch, 
decides on status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the government has the next 
choice of action if the concessionaire chooses the left branch. 
x Government responds to concessionaire’s informal action where they can either settle 
with the concessionaire (informal action) or give the concessionaire money by 
accepting (no informal action). If the government takes the choice on the right 
branch, gives the concessionaire the money, then the game ends. If the government 
chooses the left branch and decides to settle, the concessionaire has the next choice of 
action. The Government chooses between these two options depending on its stance 
on which option maximizes their benefit. For example, they might consider length of 
time needed to reach a resolution or possibility of union going on strike again or 
public opposition.  
x In this final level, the concessionaire can either take a formal action, which is 
renegotiating or no formal action, which is accepting the settlement offered. Again, 
this depends on several factors as discussed in the previous section. 
Under each choice, the payoff for each actor if the choice was taken is shown. A description of 
the notations used is presented below: 
x Ua(ǻb): utility of actor “a” under the request/benefit (ǻ) of actor “b”. An example is 
the action taken by the government in Scenario A where once of its choices is to 
accept the concessionaire’s request for a loan. This means that this action (accepting 
the concessionaire’s request) is to the benefit of the concessionaire so the 





concessionaire) whereas the payoff for the concessionaire is UC(ǻC) (read as utility of 
concessionaire for the request of concessionaire). The maximum payoff an actor can 
get is if the actor gets a utility for their request (Ua(ǻa)), while the minimum payoff 
an actor can get is a utility for the request of the opposing actor (Ua(ǻb)). 
x Įa: transaction cost for informal action taken by actor a 
x ȕa: transaction cost for formal action taken by actor a 
x Ps: probability of concessionaire winning settlement 












As shown in Figure 5.17, the payoffs for each action are listed first for the concessionaire 
followed by the government’s payoff. When an action is taken, the payoff is reduced by the cost 
of this action. So when the concessionaire takes as informal action (request a loan), the cost 
shows up under the second level, “accept” with Įa subtracted from the utility. This game is solved 
using backward induction. Since there are two actions under each level and there are three levels, 
there are a total of eight possibilities in this game. The solution is shown in Appendix C. 
 After the game is solved, a set of equations is extracted which provides criteria for the 
eight possibilities under the game. When criteria are met under one of these eight possibilities, a 
certain outcome is reached. Monte Carlo simulation is performed to get the probability of the 
outcomes using Anylogic software. The parameters used are as follows: ĮC, ĮG, ǺC, UC(ǻC), 
UC(ǻG), UG(ǻG), UG(ǻ)C, PC, and PS. The minimum possible value is zero and the maximum is 
one. Values for the parameters that were chosen are shown in Table 6.10. For example, under low 
informal cost, the value of Įi (informal cost for party i) would be 0 to 0.15. 
Since exact numbers for the cost of informal or formal cost are unavailable, values were 
chosen that depict the closest distribution for these costs. Changing these values would change 
the results for some of the scenarios therefore it is important to try out different variations and 
settling on the one that shows the closest version of the reality in a project. 
The values for each of the parameters are shown and are kept constant throughout the two 
sub-scenarios with the exception of one parameter that is changed. For example, under high 
probability of winning renegotiation, PC, the probability of concessionaire winning renegotiation 









Table 6.10 Value of Parameters for Scenario A 
 Base Case High Probability of 
winning Renegotiation 
ĮC Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮG Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ǺC Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
UCǻC Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UCǻG 0 0 
UGǻG Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UGǻC 0 0 
PC Normal(0.15,0.25) Normal(0.15,0.60) 
PS Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.55) 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Simulation results for Scenario A 
 
Note: X-axis represents the range of payoffs, for example 0.1-0.2, out of a maximum payoff of 1. 





the payoffs received ranged from 0 to 0.1 for about 200 times (out of 1000 simulations) for the 
Government (yellow) in the second scenario (high probability of concessionaire winning 
renegotiation). 
Table 6.10 shows the values of parameters used for this scenario. This game was 
simulated for 1000 simulations and the results are shown in Figure 6.2. Simulation shows that 
high probability of concessionaire winning renegotiation leads the concessionaire to try and take 
it one step further by renegotiating. The Nash equilibrium is “renegotiate” for 26 of the 
simulations under this case as compared to zero in the base case. Comparing payoffs for both 
cases show that there are no visible changes between them. The only change is in the number of 
times each of the four nodes is selected. In all scenarios, stopping at settlement is the Nash 











Figure 6.3 shows the game between the government and concessionaire. The difference 
between scenario A and B is that in scenario A the government offers a settlement at the second 
level so in the final level the concessionaire can choose between stopping at settlement and 
renegotiating. However, in scenario B the government rejects the concessionaire’s request for a 
loan from the first action so the concessionaire can either accept that and stop or try to 
renegotiate.  
 
Figure 6.4 Simulation results for Scenario B 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the result of the simulations for Scenario B. The same parameters from 
scenario A (Table 6.7) were used for all scenarios in order to keep it consistent. It can be seen that 
the concessionaire (the dark bars, in blue) gets a very low payoff for all simulations and that it 
never exceeds the 0.1 to 0.2 payoff bracket (out of the maximum of 1). On the other hand, the 
government (in yellow) receives a wider range of payoffs and sometimes receives very high 
payoffs in the 0.9 to 1 payoff bracket. It can be seen that scenario B is better than scenario A for 
the government since it has a higher chance of receiving higher payoffs but is worse for the 











Figure 6.5 is read as follows: 
x Concessionaire can ask the government for a loan (informal action) or maintain status 
quo (no informal action). If the concessionaire takes the choice on the right branch, 
decides on status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the government has the next 
choice of action if the concessionaire chooses the left branch. 
x Government responds to concessionaire’s informal action where it can either reject 
(informal action) or settle with the concessionaire (no informal action). If the 
government takes the choice on the right branch, gives the concessionaire the money, 
then the game ends. If the government chooses the left branch and decides to reject, 





x The concessionaire can either take a formal action, which is renegotiating or no 
formal action, which is no further action. 
x The final level is the government’s choice where it can either accept renegotiation 
(formal action) or take over the project. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Simulation results for Scenario C 
 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the result of the simulations for Scenario C. It can be seen that the 
concessionaire (in blue) gets a very low payoff for all simulations and that it never exceeds the 0 
to 0.1 payoff bracket (out of the maximum of 1). On the other hand, the government (in yellow) 
receives a wider range of payoffs and sometimes receives very high payoffs in the 0.9 to 1 payoff 
bracket. This scenario is good for the government since it has a higher chance of getting a high 












Figure 6.7 2-Party Game between government and concessionaire - Scenario D 
 
 
The difference between scenario C and D is that in scenario D, under the second level, 
the government can accept the concessionaire’s request for a loan but try to negotiate the amount 







Figure 6.8 Simulation results for Scenario D 
 
Figure 6.8 shows the result of the simulations for Scenario D. It can be seen that the 
concessionaire (in blue) gets a very low payoff for all simulations and that it never exceeds the 0 
to 0.1 payoff bracket (out of the maximum of 1). On the other hand, the government (in yellow) 
receives a wider range of payoffs and sometimes receives very high payoffs in the 0.9 to 1 payoff 
bracket. This scenario is similar to scenario C and is good for the government as well but worse 
for the concessionaire.  
 
 Three-Party Interactional Analysis 
 
The previous section described interactional analysis for two parties in the Tanzania Railway 
Project. It showed possible scenarios for how a negotiation setting can unfold and the possible 
outcomes along with the payoffs received by each party. This proposed methodology aims to 
present the interactions between the rational parties in a game setting to show how each of them 
can possibly act and how this choice will affect their payoff. The aim is to find the best course of 
action or strategy to take in order to reach their objective. For example, when one party is faced 





behavior to maximize their benefit), what would be their best option? And if they do decide to 
negotiate, would the best option for their opposing party be agreeing to negotiate and changing 
the financial terms of the contract or to put a stop to this notion/behavior to avoid recurrence in 
the future? These questions can be answered by transforming these questions to scenarios and 
extracting payoff equations to model the payoffs received based on taking certain actions. After 
that simulations can be conducted to extract patterns of when the highest and lowest payoffs are 












Figure 6.9 shows the game theoretic framework for the three-party interaction. The three 
parties involved are: concessionaire, government and parliament. In this case study, the 
government represents the contractual entity that signed the PPP contract with the concessionaire 
and the Parliament represents the legislative entity in Tanzania. There are five levels of actions, 
starting with the concessionaire. In each level, there are two branches, one left branch that 
represents an action and a right branch, which represents no action.  The logic in the diagram is 
read as follows: 
x Concessionaire can ask for a loan from the government (informal action) or maintain 
status quo (no informal action). If the concessionaire takes the choice on the right 
branch, decides on status quo, the game ends here; otherwise the government has the 
next choice of action if the concessionaire chooses the left branch. 
x Government responds to the concessionaire’s informal action where it can either try 
to settle with the concessionaire (informal action) or accept and give the 
concessionaire money (no informal action). If the government takes the choice on the 
right branch, gives the concessionaire money, then the game ends. If the government 
chooses the left branch and tries to settle, the concessionaire has the next choice of 
action. 
x Concessionaire here can either try to renegotiate or accept the government’s 
settlement. If the concessionaire takes the choice on the right branch and settles, the 
game ends here; otherwise the parliament has the next choice of action if the 
concessionaire chooses the left branch. 
x Parliament can choose between opposing this decision and the concessionaire (left 
branch) or not opposing (right branch). In this case the Parliament had opposed the 





concession and its attempts to secure money from the government post contract 
signing. 
x In this final level, the government has two choices to decide between. The first is 
taking a formal action against the concessionaire by canceling the project and taking 
over from the concessionaire. The second choice is not taking a formal action and 
accepting to renegotiate with the concessionaire (instead of ending their contract 
which was the first option).  
Table 6.11 Value of Parameters for Scenario E 
 Base Case High Probability of 
winning Settlement 
ĮC Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮG Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮP Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ȕC Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
ǺG Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
UCǻC Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UCǻG 0 0 
UCǻP 0 0 
UGǻG Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UGǻC 0 0 
UGǻP Uniform(0.5, 0.75) Uniform(0.5, 0.75) 
UPǻP Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UPǻC 0 0 
UPǻG Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
PS Normal(0.15,0.35) Normal(0.15,0.60) 














Figure 6.10 Simulation results for Scenario E 
 
 
Table 6.11 shows the values of parameters used for this scenario. The  results of the 1000 
simulations are shown in Figure 6.10. Simulation shows that high probability of winning 
settlement for the concessionaire leads the concessionaire to try and take it one step further by 
renegotiating. However, this tactic causes it to be more likely to get a lower payoff. In this case, 
there is a shift of payoff to the left (lower payoff) for the concessionaire while there is a shift of 
payoff to the right (higher payoff) for the government and parliament. In all scenarios, settlement 
is the Nash equilibrium in the majority of the simulations.  
According to Shlyk (2009), the actual result of the negotiation ended in the 
concessionaire pulling out its staff and the Government of Tanzania taking over the project. 





(Nash equilibrium) in this case should have been settlement. The Government of Tanzania should 
have sought a way to settle with the concessionaire and have them continue operating the 
railways instead of the result, which was the disintegration of the PPP project. 
 
 Discussion of the Tanzania Railways Project Case Study 
This section discussed the Tanzania Railway project and the problems it faced between the 
government, parliament and concessionaire. It presented a three-party negotiation scenario where 
each party has its own actions and payoffs. Tables 6.11 to 6.13 present the expected payoffs for 
all scenarios for the actors involved. The expected payoff is calculated as the summation of 
expected payoffs for the game (average for the range multiplied by number of times it occurs in 
the game). Comparing the scenarios between concessionaire and government with three levels 
(Scenarios A and B, shown in Table 6.7), Scenario A produces better payoffs for the 
concessionaire while scenario B provides better payoffs for the government.  
Tables 6.12 and 6.13 present the expected payoffs for the concessionaire and government 
for games with four levels of action. The games in Table 5.32 have very close payoffs and are 
always high for the government and low for the concessionaire. The best two-party scenario 
that produces the highest payoffs for the concessionaire is scenario A and for the government 
is scenario C closely followed by scenario D. 
Finally, Table 6.14 presents the expected payoffs for the three-party game. The 







Table 6.12 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (Concessionaire Vs. Government)  
Concessionaire (C) Government (G) Concessionaire (C) Scenario Expected 
Payoff 
Ask for loan 
OR Status Quo 












Table 6.13 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (Concessionaire Vs. Government) 
Concessionaire (C) Government (G) Concessionaire (C) Government (G) Scenario Expected 
Payoff 
Ask for loan 
OR Status Quo 
Reject   
OR Settle Renegotiate  
OR No further action 
 
Accept renegotiation  
OR Take over 
 
Scenario C C: 50 G: 870.5 
Reject  





Table 6.14 Expected Payoffs for each scenario (Concessionaire Vs. Government Vs. Parliament)  








Ask for loan  






















Tables 6.12 to 6.14 show some reasons why parties negotiate. This section describes 
a technique aimed at showing a renegotiation scenario triggered by the concessionaire and 
two possible strategies it can use. Using this technique the concessionaire can evaluate the 
outcomes for the renegotiation and if it is better to negotiate only one time or negotiate 
multiple times. In case the concessionaire chooses multiple negotiations, it has two strategies: 
act aggressively and ask for a high amount of subsidy from the beginning or act unaggressive 
and ask for a smaller subsidy in the beginning and then request another subsidy later. In the 
first strategy (aggressive), the concessionaire’s chances of winning the renegotiation are 
lower since the government will more likely oppose giving them a high subsidy.  
As discussed in previous sections, renegotiation has faced (and still faces) a large number of 
PPP projects. These renegotiations can cause imbalance in the project and change the 
dynamics between the parties. Opportunistic behavior by one party can cause the other party 
to reconsider their tactics in order to defend this ‘attack’ on the contract. In a number of 
projects (discussed in the literature review) the concessionaire has launched a series of 
renegotiations of the contract either due to changes in the current conditions or opportunistic 
behavior.  
In case of multiple contract renegotiations, the concessionaire usually has two 
strategies, the first is to start the first renegotiation aggressively and ask for a large subsidy 
from the government to guarantee maximum gain, however, their success rate could be very 
low depending on the government responsiveness. The second strategy is to start less 
aggressively and ask for a small subsidy from the government as a way to get the government 
to accept smaller amounts first and then ask for more money later or only ask for smaller 
sums more frequently. In order to visualize these two strategies, an example was created 
based on a scenario between the government and concessionaire. Figure 6.12 shows the 
sequence where a concessionaire requests a negotiation followed by government response and 







Figure 6.12 Renegotiation Scenario 
 
 As previously mentioned, there are two strategies for the concessionaire: behave 
aggressively or not aggressively.  These two strategies can be depicted by changing the value 
of the parameters in the simulation model. Table 6.15 shows the parameter values used for 
both strategies. In order to show the two strategies, assumptions were made about the 
parameters. For the first strategy (aggressive), it was assumed that the concessionaire would 
start by requesting a large subsidy in the first negotiation then request a smaller amount in the 
second one. The payoffs received from the first negotiation were given a high value with a 
low percentage of winning this negotiation since the government will more likely reject a 
request for a high subsidy. The second negotiation was given a lower payoff and a higher 
percentage of winning the negotiation since the government will be more likely to accept a 
request for a lower subsidy.  
On the other hand, for the unaggressive strategy, the concessionaire was assumed to 
start small and then move onto requests for a larger subsidy. Therefore, their payoff from the 
first negotiation was given a lower value than the second. The percentage of winning the 
negotiation was assumed to be higher in the negotiation since the government will be less 





present a renegotiation situation, which can be tailored depending on the parties’ risk aversion 
and previous history. 




Figure 6.13 Results of Aggressive Renegotiation Strategy by Concessionaire 
 
 Aggressive Strategy Unaggressive Strategy 
ĮC Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ĮG Uniform(0-0.15) Uniform(0-0.15) 
ȕC Uniform(0.15-0.25) Uniform(0.15-0.25) 
(UCǻC)1 Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.5-0.6) 
(UCǻC)2 Uniform(0.5-0.75) Uniform(0.5-0.6) 
UCǻG 0 0 
UGǻG Uniform(0.75-1) Uniform(0.75-1) 
UGǻC 0 0 
PC1 Normal(0.05,0.15) Normal(0.25,0.30) 






Figure 6.14 Results of Unaggressive Renegotiation Strategy by Concessionaire 
 
 
 Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the simulation results for the two strategies. Comparison 
between both of them shows a higher value of payoffs for the government in the aggressive 
case and for the concessionaire in the unaggressive case. This can be due to the fact that the 
government is more likely to reject the concessionaire’s aggressive approaches thus getting a 
higher payoff for themself (and a lower for the concessionaire). This result encourages the 
concessionaire to choose an unaggressive strategy to renegotiation. Under this scenario, the 
concessionaire as a decision-maker should choose the option that gives them the highest 
payoff, which is the unaggressive strategy. From the simulation, the government can identify 




This chapter discussed renegotiations, specifically in PPP projects and the causes behind its 
occurrence. It showed examples of case studies where PPP projects were renegotiated and 





Interactional analysis was proposed to understand and assess potential outcomes of a 
renegotiation scenario.  
PPP projects are a complex venture (as compared to traditional delivery) due to the longer 
contractual duration, the effect of public opinion on introducing a private party to a 
government-owned project and unique risks that manifest due to 
operational/financial/management issues. Interactional analysis was shown to be useful in 
portraying and assessing such situations of negotiation as shown in the Tanzania Railway 
Project. The negotiation scenarios can be seen in two ways, as a two party interactional 
analysis game or a three party interactional analysis game. Both games represent how a real-
life negotiation occurs between the parties involved. Five scenarios were created to show 
these possible games that were then simulated. The result was a prediction of the payoffs to 
be received by each party for the different sets of actions in a scenario. These payoffs were 
utilized to propose strategies for the parties. Interactional analysis can also be applied to 
assess whether it benefits a party to negotiate early on in the project and seek multiple 
negotiations throughout the remaining duration.  
The decision tool proposed in this dissertation can be used by any party to the project 
such as the owner, concessionaire or financiers. It can be used at any stage, before a project 
starts or throughout its different phases. It can be used for any PPP project and risk scenario 
after following the steps in the decision tool description to modify the tool for the 
project/scenario. The following steps were taken in the case study to reach the final outcome 

















































This chapter showcased the research methodology through applying two case studies: the 
Indiana Toll Road and Tanzania railway projects. First, ICRAM-PPP was applied and 
discussed to show how the risks can be assessed. Next, thresholds were chosen and high risks 
were obtained. One of these high risks was chosen for further analysis. Using scenario 
analysis, seven scenarios were created for the risk (three two-party scenarios and four three-
party scenarios). Using game theoretic concepts, the scenarios were converted into games and 
solved to create equations. Simulations were performed to analyze the differences in payoffs 





scenarios for each actor and extract their best strategies. The following chapter presents the 





7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Research Summary 
The objective of this research was to provide a guideline for risk analysis, planning and 
mitigation. This is performed through a unique twofold approach. The first part is to identify 
the risks and the second is to apply interactional analysis to a specific risk.  
Risks were collected using a systematic literature review approach to identify all risks 
form literature and case studies and use them to modify ICRAM-1 and create ICRAM-PPP. A 
quantification of the level of risk is obtained through ICRAM-PPP, which can be performed 
by any actor in a project such as the government, private company or financier. A comparison 
of each actor’s outlook on the level of risk can be compared. This can be added to a project’s 
risk plan in order to understand the different outlooks of the actors involved and avoid 
problems caused from these differences. 
A Delphi approach was used to validate the risks in ICRAM-PPP and to map out the 
phases that each risk occurs in, affects or occurs in and affects. Experts were targeted who are 
involved in the public-private-partnership arena either in academia or industry or both. 
The diagram below shows the detailed steps required for these two parts. First, ICRAM-
PPP is used to quantify risks in a project though AHP and pairwise comparison. ICRAM-PPP 
consists of three levels; macro, market and project with sublevels and risks under each. 
Prioritization is performed for all levels and risks and an assessment for each risk is given by 
the expert and a final weighted assessment is calculated. The details of these calculations are 





This risk is then used to perform scenario analysis on and create scenarios of how this 
risk can pan out. Different scenarios are created, starting with two-party scenarios and then 
increasing the complexity to three-party scenarios and a table of scenarios is filled in. Using 
interactional analysis, the scenarios are transformed into a game and equations created for it 
then solved. Simulations can then be performed using Anylogic software for the scenarios in 
order to find the differences from varying the parameters and finding the best scenarios for 
each actor. Finally, based on the analysis, plans can be created for the risk using the results of 
the scenarios. Studying the opponent’s best strategy can help each actor in determining their 
opponent’s next move and what the actor’s best response should be. Nash equilibrium, 
payoffs per actor and distribution of payoffs for each scenario are studied to create these 
























7.2 Research Limitations 
This research introduced the concept of interactional analysis of three-parties to a risk through 
the use of quantitative methods to analyze risks and game theoretic concepts to understand 
interactions between parties and their effect on the risk outcome and payoffs.  
Analyze and quantify risks (ICRAM-PPP) 
Choose high risks 
Scenario Planning for a risk 
Create a Table of actions/scenarios for 2-party and 3-party 
analysis
Using Interactional Analysis, solve these scenarios 
Simulate the scenarios using Anylogic 





ICRAM-PPP was developed based on ICRAM-1, which is based on AHP and pairwise 
comparison. In order to make it more robust, fuzzy concepts can be integrated. Global metrics 
can also be created to enhance its robustness and streamline the process since experts will 
only have to plug in numbers that are readily available.  
Complexity in this study was shown by starting with a simple two-party interaction and 
then increasing the complexity to a three-party interaction. Increasing the number of players 
increases the number of strategies in a game, number of possible scenarios and outcomes and 
also payoffs. Increasing the number of steps/levels in a game from three to four steps doubles 
the number of possible solutions to a game from eight to sixteen. Some conditions had to be 
assumed in order to perform these calculations such as the assumption of rationality of actors. 
This can be addressed by integrating behavioral psychology into the game to account for the 
behavior of actors. 
More projects can be studied in order to extract patterns of actions that maximize player 
payoffs and eliminate or mitigate the risks. 
 
7.3 Contribution 
The following are the main contributions from this research: 
x Comprehensive risk registry for PPP projects: the three levels in ICRAM-PPP 
represent all possible risks that could affect a PPP project, starting from a wider 
approach, looking at macro risks and ending at a narrow outlook on the project itself. 
x Quantification of risks among 3 hierarchic levels: quantification of risks is important 
because it provides a method to identify risks that are of higher importance that need 
to be closely monitored. It also shows the level of risks for each actor and provides a 
platform for comparison between the opinions of different actors once each one 
applies ICRAM-PPP from their perspective. 
x Scenario planning for risk analysis: a structured approach to study how a risk unfolds 





x Interactional analysis for complex 3-party risk scenarios: provides a quantitative 
method of looking into how interactions between actors impact each actor’s payoffs 
and impact the risk itself. 
x Analysis of multiple scenarios to a situation and proposing strategies: a holistic 
approach for risks is needed to address all possible views. Different scenarios are 
created using different possible actions of each actor and these scenarios are analyzed 
using game theory and simulated as well. 
x Application of the decision tool to two case studies: a real-life case study, the Indiana 
Toll Road and another case study, the Tanzania Railway project. 
 
7.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
The following are recommendations for future research that the author intends to work on: 
x Creation/inclusion of global metrics/indicators for ICRAM-PPP 
x Apply IA to various case studies and extract patterns of actions/outcomes 
x Adding behavioral and psychological ideas into the interactional analysis to capture 
the behavior of actors 
x Create a database of risk scenarios, outcomes and strategies 
x Expanding 3-party interactional analysis to n-party 
x Exploring IA beyond PPP projects, into other delivery modes 
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In this section, ICRAM-PPP for the market level (filled in by the concessionaire) is discussed 
to show how the model works. The same calculations apply for the macro and project levels. 
ICRAM-PPP is based on ICRAM-1 by Hastak and Shaked (2000), which was intended for 
use for international construction projects. Risks pertaining to PPP projects were added to 
create ICRAM-PPP and some modifications were made to the calculation process as will be 
discussed. Using AHP, weighted assessments of risks are obtained for all levels in order to 
provide a platform to prioritize risks. Next, pairwise comparison is used for risks that are 
affected by higher levels (market risks affected by macro level or project risks affected by 
macro/market levels) in order to prioritize how much they are affected by the higher levels. 
First, the AHP process is discussed below.  
 
The steps taken for the AHP are as follows (Hastak 1994): 
1. Comparison matrices are created 
a. Comparison of levels of risks 
b. Comparison of sublevels of risks 
c. Comparison of risks under each level/sub-level 
2. Priority vectors are created, consistency of matrix is checked and weighted priority 
vectors are calculated 
 
The first step is the comparison between risks by choosing from the dropdown menu from 
one of the following 5 choices in the risk comparison:  
x Much more important: (risk shown in the left column is much more important than 
risk shown in the top row) 





x Same importance  
x Less important  
x Much less important 
For example, Technology level is less important than Contracts and Legal issues level as 
shown below. Every two risks are compared and the result is a table that shows comparison 
for all risks/risk levels. 
 
 
These choices are then converted to numbers as shown below: 
x Much more important: 1.5 (risk shown in the left column is 1.5 times more important 
than risk shown in the top row) 
x More important: 1.25 
x Same importance: 1 
x Less important: 1/1.25 
x Much less important: 1/1.5 
 
The results are shown below after converting the choices to numbers. Technology level is 







The user inputs the grey boxes while the white boxes are calculated as their reciprocal. Below 


















Next, the risks impacted by the higher (macro) level are identified: 
Criteria  MARKET Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators) Impacted by Macro 
Technology 1 Investor’s technological advantage   




3 Type of partnership   
4 Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract x 
5 Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of 
many agencies, delay in granting approvals)   
Resources 
6 Availability and quality of local resources   
7 Availability of construction material   
8 Availability of skilled and unskilled labor   
9 Labor cost/productivity   
10 Availability of equipment and parts   
Financing 
11 Availability of financing  x 
12 Tax and non tax incentives   
13 Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate   




15 Interaction of foreign management   
16 A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship   
17 Risk management practices of parties involved   
Market 
Potential 
18 Current market volume in core competency   
19 Future market industry volume   
20 Bidding volume index resulting in competition   
21 Stability of associated industries   
 
Using pairwise comparison, these three risks (risk #2, #4 and #11) are compared to each other 
using the same scale as previously mentioned and shown in the table below (1.5 for much more 
important to 1/1.5 for much less important).  
Scale used for the pairwise comparison 
Level of Impact Numerical 
Much more importance 1.5 
More importance 1.25 
Same importance 1 
Less importance 1/1.25 






The first activity (risk #2) on the list is the first benchmark (value is 1) for the second activity 
(risk #4). So the second activity is compared to the first and given a value from 1.5 to 1/1.5 
depending on its value compared to the previous activity. For example, if risk #4 is more 
important than #2, then it is given a comparison value of 1.25 which is then multiplied by the 
value of #2 to get its final value: 1*1.25=1.25. Similarly, risk #11 is compared to risk #4. For 
example, if risk #11 is much more important than risk #4, the value given for the comparison is 
1.5 and activity 11’s final value is: 1.25*1.5=1.875.  
 After the comparisons are filled in, relative importance of the criteria (priority vector) is 
calculated using the method established by Thomas L. Saaty for calculating Eigen vectors. 
Normalizing the values in the columns produces the priority vectors as shown below. Values in 
the consistency matrix are calculated by multiplying the row priority vector by the comparison 
value in each cell. The consistency ratio is then calculated to ensure that it is below 0.10 (Hastak 
and Shaked 2000). The diagram below shows a snapshot of the calculations for the first level 













For the second step, a rating of the magnitude/effect/impact of the risk is inputted under the 
“Impact” column. The choices are:  
x 0: Extremely Low probability and impact  
x 25: Low probability and impact 
x 50: Medium probability and impact 
x 75: High probability and impact 
x 100: Extremely High probability and impact 
The table below shows the inputted impacts for the market level risks by the concessionaire. 
Criteria  MARKET Sub-Criteria (Risk Indicators) Impact 
Technology 1 Investor’s technological advantage 25 




3 Type of partnership 25 
4 Type and enforceability of construction and concession contract 0 
5 Procedure for bidding and design approvals (e.g., presence of many 
agencies, delay in granting approvals) 0 
Resources 
6 Availability and quality of local resources 25 
7 Availability of construction material 0 
8 Availability of skilled and unskilled labor 25 
9 Labor cost/productivity 25 
10 Availability of equipment and parts 0 
Financing 
11 Availability of financing  25 
12 Tax and non tax incentives 0 
13 Fluctuation in interest rate/exchange rate 0 




15 Interaction of foreign management 0 
16 A/E/C firms and client-owner relationship 0 
17 Risk management practices of parties involved 0 
Market 
Potential 
18 Current market volume in core competency 0 
19 Future market industry volume 0 
20 Bidding volume index resulting in competition 0 






The figure below shows the final results of the calculations. On the left, the levels are shown with 
their weights as well. Under each level, there are risks that are shown with their weight, whether 
they are impacted by the macro level, assessment (impact as given by user) and finally the 
weighted assessment, which is calculated by multiplying the weight and the assessment. The sum 
of all weighted assessments for the market level is shown to be 13.23. This value can be 
compared to the values for macro and project risks in order to establish which level has the 
highest level of risk. It can also be compared to the value obtained from the input of other parties 









Sample solution for Interactional Analysis Scenarios 
 
This appendix presents the solution for Interactional Analysis Scenario C from the 
Indiana Toll Road Case Study. 
Backward induction is used to calculate the equations for equilibrium starting 
from the lowest level. Since there are four levels and two options under each level, there 
is a total of sixteen paths/solutions available for this game. The game is solved as shown 
below starting from the last level (level 4) to the first level (level 1) in order to reach all 
possible solutions. The number of possible paths increases as we go form level 4 to level 
1 since there are two options under each level.  
Level 4:  
Contractor chooses “Negotiation” if its payoff is higher than “Litigation”, if: 
ȕC  (PL - PN) [UCǻC - UCǻi]  
Level 3:  
There are two possible paths under this level (i and ii) depending on whether the 
contractor chose “Negotiation” or “Litigation” in the previous level (level 4). 
i- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Settlement” if its payoff is 
higher than “Negotiation”, if: 
ȕi  (1 - PN) [Uiǻi - UiǻC]  
ii- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Settlement” if its payoff is 





ȕi  (1 – PL) [Uiǻi - UiǻC]  
Level 2:  
There are four choices possible paths under this level (i to iv) depending on two things: a) 
whether the contractor chose “Negotiation” or “Litigation” in the previous level (level 4), 
and b) whether IFA chose “Settlement”, or the other option (highest between 
“Negotiation” or “Litigation”, which was the contractor’s choice in level 4). 
i- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor 
chooses “Plan Modification” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”, if:  
ĮC  UCǻC - UCǻi 
ii- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Negotiation”, Contractor 
chooses “Plan Modification” if its payoff is higher than “Negotiation”, if: 
ĮC + ȕC  PN [UCǻC - UCǻi]  
iii- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor 
chooses “Plan Modification” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”, if: 
ĮC  UCǻC - UCǻi  
iv- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Litigation”, Contractor chooses 
“Plan Modification” if its payoff is higher than “Litigation”, if:  
ĮC + ȕC  PL [UCǻC - UCǻi]  
Level 1:  
There are eight choices possible paths under this level (i to viii). 
i- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor 






Įi  Uiǻi - UiǻC  
ii- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor 
chooses “Settlement”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”, 
if:  
Įi  0  
iii- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Negotiation”, Contractor 
chooses “Plan Modification”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Plan 
Modification”, if: 
Įi  Uiǻi - UiǻC 
iv- Given Contractor chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Negotiation”, Contractor 
chooses “Negotiation”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than 
“Negotiation”, if: 
Įi + ȕi  (1 - PN) [Uiǻi – UiǻC]  
v- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor chooses 
“Plan Modification”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Plan 
Modification”, if: 
Įi  Uiǻi - UiǻC  
vi- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Settlement”, Contractor chooses 
“Settlement”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”, if: 
Įi  0 





“Plan Modification”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Settlement”, 
if:  
Įi  Uiǻi - UiǻC 
viii- Given Contractor chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Litigation”, Contractor 
chooses “Litigation”, IFA chooses “Status Quo” if its payoff is higher than “Litigation”, 
if:  
Įi + ȕi  (1 – PL) [Uiǻi – UiǻC]  
All these combinations are transformed into the sixteen possible solutions/paths to write 
the simulation code for the Anylogic software. Results of the simulation for this scenario 
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